THE FAILED CASE FOR EIGHTH AMENDMENT REGULATION

OF THE CAPITAL-SENTENCING TRIAL
ScorrW. HowEt
Since banning standardless capital sentencing as "cruel and unusual punishment" in Furman v. Georgia,' the Supreme Court has
regulated capital-sentencing procedures under the Eighth Amend23
ment. Many who have written about these efforts have disapproved.
One group of critics has argued for additional or more intensive
regulation. These critics have focused on the Court's failure to
achieve its stated goal of consistency in capital sentencing.4 A different group of critics has lamented the perceived side effects of the
Court's regulatory efforts. Such critics have complained, for example,
that the Court has unnecessarily disrupted state efforts to impose the
death penalty5 or has conveyed, through the Justices' frequent failure
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' 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2 The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
s For a thorough and recent critique of the Court's capital-sentencing jurisprudence, see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 357
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CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 29 (1995) (criticizing the Supreme Court on the ground that
"[t]he established application of the Eighth Amendment to the administration of the
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basis"); Ted Guest, A House Without a Blueprint, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,July 8, 1996,
at 41, 41 (contending that "[t]he Supreme Court is a prime culprit" in thwarting the
will of the citizenry favoring the death penalty through "[t]wo decades of decisions
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to find consensus, a poor message regarding our ability to reconcile
social conflicts. 6 Of the Court's many critics on capital sentencing,
however, only a few, at least in recent years, have challenged the
Court's basic7decision to regulate capital sentencing under the Eighth
Amendment.
The scholars who have challenged the propriety of the Court's effort to govern capital sentencing have typically relied on formalist
attacks that concede no ground for Eighth Amendment regulation.
For example, Professor Raoul Berger, invoking the duty to follow
original intent, has emphasized that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was not understood by its promulgators to govern the
process for selecting which capital offenders will die. 8 Similarly,
Justice Thomas has concluded that the Eighth Amendment was originally intended only to place substantive limitations on punishments
and that the Court should not have abandoned that original understanding by regulating capital-sentencing procedures. 9 Chief Justice
Rehnquist has reached a similar conclusion that is based, in part, on a
view of the plain meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.' o
This Article rejects the role of the Court in regulating capital sentencing under the Eighth Amendment on prudential grounds rather
attempting to sort out the rules for executions [that] have left prosecutors and defense lawyers more confused than enlightened"); The Waiting Game, ECONOMIsT, Apr.
1, 1995, at 19, 19-20 (noting the views of some observers that the small ratio of executions to death sentences stems in part from Supreme Court rulings on capital sentencing that have resulted in "case law that is inherently unstable and open to challenge").
6 See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Disorderin the Court: The Death Penalty and
the Constitution,
85 MICH. L. REV. 1741, 1819 (1987) ("The Justices have provided this lesson, though
unwittingly, by embodying their conceptions of American society: In conflicts among
implacably opposed adversaries, nothing is ever sensibly resolved or learned.").
Although I favor abolition, this Article focuses on the question whether, assuming capital punishment is to be employed, the Eighth Amendment regulates the
capital-sentencing trial. For a classic argument for abolition, see CHARLES L. BLACK
JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MIsTAKE (1974).
8 See generally RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 44-49, 47 (1982) ("[Slpecial

safeguards in application of the death penalty were provided by the Fifth Amendment
precisely because the Framers postulated that the death penalty was unaffected by the
Eighth Amendment.").
9 SeeGraham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 488 (1993) (Thomas,J.,
concurring) ("[T]he
better view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to place
only substantive limitations on punishments, not procedural requirements on sentencing.... ").

10See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 371 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("The prohibition of the Eighth Amendment relates to the character of the punishment, and not to the process by which it is imposed.").

1998]

ETGHTH AMENDMENTAND CAPITAL SENTENCING

797

than based on formalist views about the original understanding or

plain meaning of the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments." This Article argues that the Eighth Amendment speaks to
the question of who can receive the death penalty and does so in
terms that should guide the capital sentencer. The Eighth Amend-

ment does not call for consistency among capital offenders, but
rather speaks to the substantive standard that defines who may be
sentenced to death. The relevant Eighth Amendment command is to

avoid imposing the death penalty on those who do not deserve that
sanction.

Nonetheless, this Article demonstrates that the Supreme

Court lacks the capacity to translate this general Eighth Amendment
principle into rules for conducting capital-sentencing trials."
This Article advocates Eighth Amendment restrictions on determining who is subject to the death penalty. It concludes, however,
that the Court should only draw categorical lines separating deatheligible crimes and offenders on the one hand, and crimes and of-

fenders for which the death penalty is per se improper on the other
hand. Rape, for example, is not a death-eligible crime. Similarly,
" The Article does not suggest that the Court has pursued the deserts-limitation
principle and failed, for the Court generally has been incoherent about its aim in
regulating capital sentencing. Pursuing the deserts-limitation principle in capital
sentencing would require the Court to regulate the sentencing proceeding so as to
enable and require sentencers to find that the offender deserves death as a prerequisite to a death sentence. See infra Part III. The Court has often cited the elimination
of arbitrariness in capital sentencing as its goal. However, this theory is not very
helpful without a substantive measure by which to judge what differences among cases
matter, and the Court has not provided such a measure. The Court has sometimes
stated that the relevant measure is offender "culpability," see, e.g., McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 443 (1990) (stating that "'the punishment should be directly
related to the personal culpability of the defendant'" (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 327 (1989))), but has not pursued doctrine consistent with this approach.
See infrd notes 175-77 and accompanying text; see alsoJohnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,
373 (1993) (approving a Texas statute that made an offender's probable future
dangerousness a dispositive factor in deciding which capital offenders would receive
death sentences). For this reason, uncertainty prevails over how to describe what the
Court has sought to accomplish through its regulation of capital-sentencing trials.
Compare Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 366-69 (contending that remedying the
problem of "underinclusion'----the failure to impose death sentences on some who
deserve that sanction-was one of the important goals of the Court in regulating
capital sentencing), with David McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of the Supreme Court's
Death Penalty JurisprudenceAccording to the Court's Own Goals: Mild Success or Major
Disaster, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 545, 548 (1997) (contending that "the Court has had
only one primary goal for its regulation of capital punishment: decreasing overinclusion, with particular interest in minimizing invidious overinclusion due to racial bias").
The Court's failure to articulate a coherent regulatory theory, however, is a separate
problem from the issue of whether overwhelming difficulties are inherent in any
efforts to regulate capital-sentencing trials.
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seventeen-year-old offenders are not subject to the death penalty.
These are the sorts of conclusions that the Court could legitimately
articulate and enforce under the deserts limitation in the Eighth
Amendment.
The problem for the Court in pursuing the deserts limitation as a
basis for regulating the capital-sentencing trial stems from the inability to identify with substantial precision how to measure offender
deserts. The Court cannot define the weight that the capital sentencer should accord various evidentiary factors. Nor can the Court
define with much precision what evidence the capital sentencer
should consider. The societal consensus in favor of the deserts limitation does not translate into rules at these more exacting levels. Yet, to
enforce the deserts limitation at the capital-sentencing trial requires
the Court to articulate relatively precise rules. If the Court cannot
provide specifics, the Eighth Amendment can no longer justify preventing legislatures from specifying the rules.
My demonstration of the inevitability of failure in attempts at
Eighth Amendment regulation of capital-sentencing trials proceeds in
four stages. Part I briefly describes the development and contours of
the Supreme Court's current capital-sentencing doctrine. Part II
then assesses the "nonarbitrariness" or "consistency" theory usually
offered by the Court as the justification for this doctrine. The Article
demonstrates not only that this theory fails to explain the Court's
capital-sentencing holdings, but also, more importantly, that the
theory lacks a grounding in the Eighth Amendment. Part III assesses
the deserts-limitation principle as a basis for capital-sentencing regulation, and demonstrates that this principle explains certain aspects of
the Court's doctrine better than the nonarbitrariness theory. The
deserts limitation, stated broadly, also conforms with the Eighth
Amendment. The Article argues, however, that the principledoes
not translate into the sort of rules with which the Court can sensibly
regulate capital-sentencing trials. Part IV proposes a limited use of
the deserts-limitation principle to articulate bright-line rules defining
the boundaries of constitutional application of the death penalty.
The Article concludes that the Court has appropriately employed the
Eighth Amendment on occasion to promulgate these kinds of restrictions and that its approach to regulating capital punishment should
focus on expanding these protections.
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I. FURMANAND ITS FRUITS: CONSISTENCY AS THE GOAL
Considered as a prelude to the regulation of capital-sentencing
trials, the decision in Furman v. Georga 2 was spectacularly flawed. If
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments was used appropriately to narrow the number of death-eligible crimes and offenders,
standardless capital sentencing should not violate the Eighth
Amendment. Indeed, the Court's current doctrine has effectively
endorsed standardless discretion by the sentencer at the ultimate
stage of choosing between imprisonment and death. The inability to
distinguish a just from an unjust death sentence has prevented the
Court from prescribing standards that actually guide the sentencer's
decision. Yet this very inability to define a just death sentence calls
into question the basic legitimacy of the Court's project to regulate
capital-sentencing trials under the Eighth Amendment.
A. Furman and the 1976 Cases
The meaning of the per curiam order in Furman is elusive. In
Furman, the Supreme Court, for the first time, used the Eighth
Amendment to strike down a capital sentence.'3 The splintered, fiveJustice majority clearly condemned standardless capital sentencing.
However, the majority offered little guidance regarding what sort of
sentencing systems would pass muster. Two majority JusticesBrennan and Marshall-believed the death penalty unconstitutional
in all circumstances. 4 The three other majority Justices-Douglas,
Stewart, and White-did little to clarify what kind of systems the
Eighth Amendment would allow, beyond separately expressing their
dissatisfaction with standardless sentencing schemes. Each of these
three Justices appeared to strike a blow against "arbitrary" and
"capricious" sentencing systems,'5 but that prohibition carried an
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
s See id. at 239-40 (per curiam) ("The Court holds that the imposition and carry-

12

ing out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
,4See id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The punishment of death is... 'cruel
and unusual' punishment and the States may no longer inflict it as a punishment for
crimes."); id at 359 (Marshall,J., concurring) ("There is no rational basis for concluding that capital punishment is not excessive. It therefore violates the Eighth Amendment.").
'5 See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[T]hese discretionary statutes
are ...pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel
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accordion-like range of potential meanings. Were states that desired
to use the death penalty required to make it mandatory for all capital
offenders? Were they instead only required to provide relatively
precise standards to govern the capital-sentencing decision? Or could
they simply narrow the group subject to the death penalty while
granting the sentencer unfettered discretion to impose either death
or imprisonment for that smaller group?
Four years after Furman, the Court revisited the question of
Furman's meaning in a well-known quintet of decisions. 16 Nearly twothirds of the states had promptly enacted new death-penalty statutes
after 1972.17 Their responses to Furmanwere of two kinds. The majority of these states adopted legislation making the death penalty
mandatory upon conviction for a capital offense. 8 The minority
adopted statutes providing for a capital-sentencing hearing with
standards.' 9 In the 1976 cases, the Supreme Court upheld statutes
from Florida, Georgia, and Texas that provided for capital-sentencing

and unusual' punishments."); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[O]f all the
people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible
as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed." (footnote omitted)); id at 313
(White, J., concurring) ("[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even
for the most atrocious crimes and.., there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.").
" The decision in each case was issued on July 2, 1976. See Roberts v. Louisiana,
428 U.S. 325 (1976) (considering a Louisiana statute mandating the death penalty for
convicted first-degree murderers); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(considering North Carolina's mandatory death-penalty statute for first-degree murderers); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (considering a Texas statute that limited
the definition of capital homicides and required the jury to answer three special
questions in the affirmative before the death penalty could be imposed); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (considering a Florida statute requiring the trial judge to
weigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors in order to decide whether, the
death penalty should be imposed); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
(considering a Georgia statute that required the judge or jury to consider aggravating
and mitigating factors before imposing the death penalty).
17 Thirty-five states passed new death-penalty statutes after Furman and before the
Supreme Court ruled on these new efforts in 1976. SeeJohn W. Poulos, The Supreme
Court, CapitalPunishmentand the Substantive CriminalLaw: The Rise andFallof Mandatory
CapitalPunishment,28 ARIZ. L. REv. 143, 226, 238 tbl.1 (1986).
's Twenty-two of the 35 states enacted statutes mandating the death penalty upon
conviction. See id. at 227, 238 tbl.1. These legislative mandates varied according to the
manner in which they defined the capital offense(s) involved. See id. at 200-26.
9 The standards employed varied substantially from state to state. See generally
Note, Discretionand the Constitutionalityof the New DeathPenalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1699-709 (1974) (discussing post-Furman death-penalty statutes and describing the
various standards they imposed to limit discretion).
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hearings with standards. 20 At the same time, the Court struck down
statutes from Louisiana and North Carolina mandating the death
penalty upon conviction.
At the rhetorical level, the opinions supporting these decisions
portrayed Furman's holding as requiring that capital sentences be
administered to promote consistency. For example, in upholding the
Georgia statute in Gregg v. Georgia,Justice Stewart, writing for himself
and two other Justices, reiterated that Furman stood for the proposition that the death penalty "could not be imposed under sentencing
procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner. " 72 Justice White, in endorsing
the Georgia statute, implied that Furmanhad required that a capitalsentencing system "result in death sentences being imposed with
reasonable consistency."23 Likewise, in Woodson v. North Carolina,
Justice Stewart, for a plurality, asserted that Furmanhad required that
states replace "arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective
standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the
process for imposing a sentence of death., 24 This kind of language in
the opinions in the 1976 cases constructed a view that Furman required substantial equality in the distribution of death sentences
among convicted capital offenders.2

20 See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 259-60 (plurality opinion) (upholding the Florida statute
because "[t]hat legislation provides that after a person is convicted of first-degree
murder, there shall be an informed, focused, guided, and objective inquiry into the
question whether he should be sentenced to death"); Gregg; 428 U.S. at 206-07
(plurality opinion) (upholding the Georgia statute because it allowed the jury to give
individualized consideration of defendants based on certain standards);Jurek, 428 U.S.
at 276 (plurality opinion) (upholding the Texas statute because, "[b]y narrowing its
definition of capital murder, Texas has essentially said that there must be at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance in a first-degree murder case before a death
sentence may even be considered" and the state allowed presentation of mitigating
factors).
21 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-05 (plurality opinion) (striking down the North
Carolina statute due to its failure to provide standards to guide a jury's decision to
impose the death penalty and to allow individualized consideration of defendants);
Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335-36 (plurality opinion) (holding that the Louisiana mandatory
death-penalty statute was unconstitutional on grounds similar to those in Woodson).
2428
U.S. at 188 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 222 (White,J., concurring in judgment).
24 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality
opinion).
2The
Court has continued to portray Furmanas requiring an acceptable pattern
representing the divide between those who receive the death penalty and those who
are spared. See, e.g., Lewis v.Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (noting that states must
"make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death"'" (quoting
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At first blush, the Court's approval of the statutes from Florida,
Georgia, and Texas also appeared consistent with the Justices' rhetoric regarding the meaning of Furman. In Gregg, the Court upheld a
Georgia system that required the capital sentencer to find an aggravating factor from a statutory list before proceeding to a discretionary
decision between imprisonment and death. 26 Gregg argued that this
system would not lead to consistent results because it did not guide
the jury's ultimate decision.
However, the Court rejected Gregg's
contention, based in part on a provision in the statute requiring the
Georgia Supreme Court to review all Georgia death sentences to
ensure consistency of application.2 Although the Florida statute did
not provide for such appellate review, that system required a more
elaborate balancing by capital sentencers of statutory lists of aggravators and mitigators before the imposition of a death sentence2
Likewise, the Texas system actually guided the sentencer's decision
based on three "special issue" questions." Thus, the three systems
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting Woodson,
428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion)))).
26 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-65 (plurality opinion) ("Before a convicted defendant
may be sentenced to death... the jury, or the trial judge in cases tried without ajury,
must find beyond a reasonable doubt one of the 10 aggravating circumstances specified in the statute.").
27 See id. at 203 (plurality opinion).
See id,
at 204 (plurality opinion).
2 See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (discussing
the capital-sentencing procedure required by the post-Furman Florida statute).
so SeeJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (plurality opinion).
The Texas statute required the sentencing jury or judge to answer the following
specific questions:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071 (b) (West 1981). The Texas legislature amended
the statute after the Supreme Court, in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 320-28 (1989),
held it unconstitutional as applied to a mentally retarded offender with a background
of abuse.
The new Texas statute poses two questions similar to the first two questions in the
old statute and also, as a precondition to a death sentence, requires the sentencer to
answer negatively the following broad question:
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and background, and
the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigat-
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that the Court approved gave some appearance of promoting consistency in the treatment of convicted capital offenders.
The crucial plurality Justices-Stewart, Powell, and Stevens-also
portrayed the rejection of the mandatory death statutes from North
Carolina and Louisiana as promoting consistency.3 ' A mandatory
death statute treats convicted capital offenders uniformly by requiring
the death penalty for all of them. The plurality contended, however,
that uniform treatment of convicted offenders was inequitable because differences existed among them 32 and those differences justified sparing some convicted capital offenders from the death

ing circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed.
TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071(2) (e) (West Supp. 1998).
3' See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion)
("While a mandatory death penalty statute may reasonably be expected to increase the
number of persons sentenced to death, it does not fulfill Furman's basic requirement
by replacing arbitrary and wanton discretion with objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.");
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Louisiana's
mandatory death sentence statute also fails to comply with Furman's requirement that
standardless jury discretion be replaced by procedures that safeguard against the
arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences.").
The plurality also relied on two other grounds to reject the mandatory death
statutes. First, the plurality contended that the mandatory death statutes conflicted
with the legislative rejection of such statutes beginning in the middle of the 19th
century. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 295 (plurality opinion) ("The consistent course
charted by the state legislatures and by Congress since the middle of the past century
demonstrates that the aversion ofjurors to mandatory death penalty statutes is shared
by society at large."). Second, the plurality asserted that the mandatory death statutes
causedjurors to acquit persons otherwise guilty of the capital offense and, thus, merely
shifted the locus of arbitrary action to the guilt-or-innocence trial. See id at 302
(plurality opinion) ("[T]here is general agreement that American juries have persistently refused to convict a significant portion of persons charged with first-degree
murder of that offense under mandatory death penalty statutes."). These arguments
failed to acknowledge that most death-penalty states viewed mandatory statutes as the
best choice after Furman, see Poulos, supra note 17, at 227, 238 tbl.1 (indicating that 22
of the 35 states that enacted new death-penalty statutes between 1972 and 1976
adopted statutes mandating the death penalty upon conviction), and that systems like
Georgia's, which the Court approved, allowed for much arbitrariness at sentencing,
see, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983) (conceding that the Georgia
scheme upheld in Gregg allowed a jury "unbridled discretion in determining whether
the death penalty should be imposed" once the jury had identified a single aggravating circumstance).
32 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-06 (plurality opinion) (arguing that the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires individual
consideration of each offender).
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penalty.33 The North Carolina statute was limited to those guilty of
either premeditated killing or a killing committed during certain
felony crimes,'34 and the Louisiana statute applied to an even narrower
category of murders.3 5 The plurality Justices concluded, however, that
it was improper even to reserve the mandatory death penalty for those
guilty of limited categories of aggravated murder.36 Separating the
group to be executed from one which should be spared could only be
accomplished through an inquiry providing "consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense." 7 The plurality did not clarify which
facets of an individual's background and crime were relevant. However, the mandatory death statutes before the Court allowed for consideration of almost no factors and so could not pass muster.3
B. Lockett and the Broad IndividualizationRule

The Court soon addressed what information the capital offender
must remain free to present and in what ways the capital sentencer
must be free to use the information to reject a death sentence. Was
the sentencer to resolve what punishment the offender deserved, or,
instead, a more utilitarian question, such as whether the offender
" See id. at 305 n.39 (plurality opinion) (implying that the death penalty is inappropriate in some cases depending on "the circumstances of the crime and the
character and record of the offender").
Under the North Carolina statute covering murder, only those guilty of firstdegree murder were subject to the mandatory death statute. See id at 286-87 (plurality
opinion). First-degree murder was defined to include premeditated killings and those
killings committed in the course of certain enumerated felonies. See id. at 286
(plurality opinion). North Carolina also enacted a statute shortly after Furman mandating the death penalty for first-degree rape. See id. at 287 n.6 (plurality opinion).
In Louisiana, the mandatory death statute also applied to first-degree murder,
but that crime was limited to five relatively specific categories of homicide and was
defined so as to require proof in four of the five cases that the defendant had the
"specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." Roberts, 428 U.S. at 329 n.3
(plurality opinion).
See id. at 332 (plurality opinion) ("That Louisiana has adopted a different and
somewhat narrower definition of first-degree murder than North Carolina is not of
controlling constitutional significance.").
37 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality
opinion).
s' See id. (plurality opinion) (concluding that the North Carolina statute "excludes
from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind"); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333 (plurality opinion) ("The constitutional vice of mandatory death sentence statutes-lack of focus on the circumstances of the particular
offense and the character and propensities of the offender-is not resolved by Louisiana's limitation of first-degree murder to various categories of killings.").
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posed a future danger? 9 Although the Court did not define the
substantive focus of the sentencing inquiry, a plurality ruled broadly,
in Lockett v. Ohio, that the capital sentencer must remain free to consider any evidence that the capital offender proffers that relates to the
offender's character, record, or crime.
On this basis, the Court
invalidated an Ohio statute that limited the sentencer to reprieving
the capital offender on only three narrow grounds. While the Court
" Professor Garvey has described the difference between these two kinds of
inquiries:
Retributivism holds that punishment is justified when it is deserved.... [R]etributivism is deontological and backward-looking. In contrast to forward-looking consequentialist approaches that justify punishment
in the name of what might be, retributivism justifies punishment in the name
of what has been. Punishment strictly predicated on moral desert is blind to
the future.
Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentendng, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1012 (1996).
'0 See 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e conclude that the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest
kind of capital cases, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor,any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." (footnote
omitted)); see also id. at 620-21 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) ("The Ohio
statute, with its blunderbuss, virtually mandatory approach to imposition of the death
penalty for certain crimes, wholly fails to recognize the unique individuality of every
criminal defendant who comes before its courts.").
Although Locket4 in dealing with the constitutionality of the mandatory death
sentence imposed in that case, was decided by a four-Justice plurality with Justice
Marshall in concurrence, the five Justices agreed that the Ohio statute had precluded
adequate consideration of mitigating evidence. See id. at 606 (plurality opinion) ("The
Ohio death penalty statute does not permit the type of individualized consideration of
mitigating factors we now hold to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases."); id. at 620 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) ("As the
plurality points out, petitioner was sentenced to death under a statutory scheme that
precluded any effective consideration of her degree of involvement in the crime, her
age, or her prospects for rehabilitation."). Justice Marshall declined to join the
plurality opinion to avoid suggesting that the death penalty was sometimes constitutional. See id. at 621 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) ("I do not.. .join in the
Court's assumption that the death penalty may ever be imposed without violating the
command of the Eighth Amendment that no 'cruel and unusual punishments' be
imposed.").
" The statute mandated the death penalty unless,
"considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history,
character, and condition of the offender, one or more of the following [was]
established by a prepondence [preponderance] of the evidence:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact
that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
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had only recently approved the Texas system, under which the capital
42
sentencer also could reprieve the offender on only three grounds,
the Court found the Ohio questions overly restrictive.4 The Ohio
statute did not allow the capital sentencer to give mitigating weight to
such evidence as an offender's youth or minor participation in the
capital crime."
In subsequent decisions, the Court has generally remained committed to Locket's broad individualization rule. In the decade after
Lockett, the Court reversed death sentences whenever trial courts
precluded consideration of mitigating evidence regarding the offender or her crime. 45 These decisions involved evidence related to
several substantive issues. Some related to the offender's lack of

(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or
mental deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity."
Id. at 612-13 (appendix to opinion of the Court) (second alteration in original)
(quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (1975)).
42 For the text of the three questions in the Texas statute, see supra note 30.
'S See supra note 40.
44 On the same date, the Court also reversed a death sentence in another Ohio
case on the ground that the same statute failed to enable the sentencer to reject the
capital punishment based on such factors as the defendant's low intelligence, emotional disturbance, youth, and troubled and violent upbringing. See Bell v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 637, 641-43 (1978) (plurality opinion).
4- See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397-99 (1987) (ruling that the
list of

mitigating factors in a state statute, when interpreted by the trial judge as exclusive,
prevented consideration of, among other things, evidence that the defendant had
suffered possible brain damage from sniffing gasoline during adolescent years, had
been raised in conditions of gross social adversity, and had been a "fond and affectionate uncle"); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1986) (reversing the
exclusion by the trial judge of evidence that the defendant had been well-behaved in
jail to show not merely a positive aspect of the defendant's character, but also that he
would pose no undue danger to others in prison and could lead a useful life behind
bars if sentenced to life imprisonment); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113
(1982) (holding that the interpretation of the sentencing statute by the sentencing
judge as not permitting consideration of evidence of the defendant's emotional
disturbance, and troubled and violent upbringing violated the Lockett rule); see also
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 370-71, 384 (1988) (stating that the trial judge's jury
instructions might mislead the jurors into thinking that the death-penalty statute
required that particular mitigating factors be found unanimously before being given
consideration, which precluded adequate consideration of evidence of the defendant's relative youth and mental infirmity); cf. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433,
439-44 (1990) (holding that a statutory requirement that a jury unanimously find
mitigating circumstances before giving them consideration precluded adequate
consideration of, among other things, evidence of the defendant's emotional disturbance and age).
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future dangerousness. 46 Some related to the offender's responsibility
for the capital offense. 47 Some revealed the offender's good acts
unrelated to the capital offense.4 s The Court also implied that where
evidence potentially served more than one mitigating function, the
sentencer should remain free to consider it for any of several proffered purposes. 49 In 1989, the Court even invalidated, as applied to a
mentally retarded and abused offender, the three-question system
from Texas that it had upheld in 1976. 5' The Court found that, although the evidence of mental retardation and abuse bore on the
offender's moral responsibility, the Texas statutory questions did not
allow the sentencer to give the evidence mitigating weight.5'

46 See, e.g., Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5-6 (focusing on evidence
of the defendant's good
behavior in jail when proffered to prove defendant's likely favorable adjustment in
prison if spared from death).
47 See, e.g., McKoy, 494 U.S. at 439-44 (invalidating requirement that jury
find
mitigating circumstances unanimously before giving them mitigating weight because it
impeded adequate consideration of the defendant's age and emotional disturbance);
Mills, 486 U.S. at 370-71, 384 (invalidating the death sentence imposed as a result of
possible misinterpretation by the jury that the death-penalty statute required mitigating circumstances be found unanimously by jury before receiving mitigating weight
because it precluded adequate consideration of mitigating evidence, which included
the defendant's youthfulness and mental disability); Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 397-99
(rejecting practice of limiting potential mitigating factors to those on the statutory list
which precluded from consideration the defendant's apparent mental disabilities
caused by sniffing gasoline as a youth and the defendant's upbringing in conditions of
social and financial poverty); Eddings,455 U.S. at 110 (rejecting trial court's interpretation of sentencing statute because it prohibited consideration of evidence of the
defendant's emotional disturbance, turbulent upbringing, and background of abuse).
"s See Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 397-99 (ruling that the jury must be allowed to consider
mitigating factors not on the statutory list and implying that evidence that the defendant was a "fond and affectionate uncle" could be considered).
49 The Court made this point in its opinion
in Skipper
[A] defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment
to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant
to the sentencing determination.... Assuming, however, that the [state's]
rule would in any case have the effect of precluding the defendant from introducing otherwise admissible evidence for the explicit purpose of convincing the jury that he should be spared the death penalty because he would
pose no undue danger to his jailers or fellow prisoners and could lead a useful life behind bars if sentenced to life imprisonment, the rule would not pass
muster under Eddings.
Skipper,476 U.S. at 7.
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) ("[W]e conclude that the jury
was not provided with a vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that
evidence in rendering its sentencing decision.").
", See id. at 320-28 (discussing the three-question system and its implications for
evidence presented in the instant case).
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C. The NarrowingRequirement

It has become clear during the last two decades that the broad individualization mandate only works effectively under a sentencing
scheme that allows the sentencer unfettered choice between death
and imprisonment at the final stage of decisionmaking. This reality
poses no problem for existing capital-sentencing systems because all
existing systems simply narrow the group of capital offenders subject
to a discretionary decision based on the parties' evidentiary presentations.52 The narrowing function is accomplished by merely requiring
the jury at the guilt-or-innocence stage of the trial or the sentencer to
identify at least one aggravating factor from a statutory list. This
requirement is a prerequisite to the final stage of discretionary decisionmaking by the sentencer. In fact, the Supreme Court endorsed
this approach in 1976 when it approved the Florida and Georgia
systems. 3 Although the Court at the time had erroneously characterized those systems as "channeling" sentencer discretion on the deci-

In 1993, the Court retreated from its strict enforcement of the Lockett rule, at least
for offenders convicted under the old Texas statute. Although, in 1989, the Court had
struck down the Texas statute as applied to a mentally retarded offender with a history
of abuse, see supra note 50 and accompanying text, the Court upheld the statute as
applied to two youthful offenders, one of whom also had a history of abuse. See
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993) ("We decide that there is no reasonable
likelihood that the jury would have found itself foreclosed from 'considering the
relevant aspects of petitioner's youth."); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 475 (1993)
("In this case... Graham's mitigating evidence was not placed beyond the jury's
effective reach."). In each case, the offender contended that the evidence bore on his
reduced culpability and pointed out that the statute did not ask a question that
effectively allowed the jury to consider the evidence for what it informed about culpability. A five-Justice majority in each case, however, concluded that the jurors would
understand that they should consider the evidence under the second question,
regarding future dangerousness, for what it revealed about offender culpability. See
Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368 ("We believe that there is ample room in the assessment of
future dangerousness for a juror to take account of the difficulties of youth as a
mitigating force in the sentencing determinations."); Graham, 506 U.S. at 475 ("The
jury was not forbidden to accept the suggestion of Graham's lawyers that his brief
spasm of criminal activity in May 1981 was properly viewed, in light of his youth, his
background, and his character, as an aberration that was not likely to be repeated.").
This conclusion was justifiably criticized. See, e.g., id. at 519 (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[A] sufficiently young defendant may have his continuing youth considered under
the second issue as aggravating, not mitigating.").
512
For a recent summary of capital-sentencing systems, focusing on the tendency of
statutes to exclude persons from eligibility for the death penalty in ways that are not
required by Supreme Court doctrine, see McCord, supra note 11, at 561-67.
-" SeeProffitt v. Florida 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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sion between imprisonment and death,-" the Court later clarified that
a sentencing system need only "narrow" the group of offenders subject to discretionary decisionmaking.
The Court also retracted its
suggestion from 1976 that the Georgia system was acceptable because
of the anticipated review for consistency to be provided by the Georgia appellate court.56 The Supreme Court declared that the narrowing function involved in the identification of an aggravating factor
was all that the Eighth Amendment required as an adjunct to the
broad, individualized inquiry. 7
In the final analysis, then, the Court's Eighth Amendment regulation of capital-sentencing trials reduces to two mandates. First, a
capital-sentencing system must allow for the presentation of a broad
swath of mitigating evidence by the offender and the exercise of
discretion by the sentencer. This individualization requirement calls

See, e.g., Gregg 428 U.S. at 206 (plurality opinion) (contending that, under the
Georgia system, "thejury's discretion is channeled").
55 In Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), the Court declared that it had upheld
the Georgia system "even though it clearly did not channel the jury's discretion." Id at
875. The Court clarified in Zant that an aggravating circumstance need only
"genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty
and... reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant
compared to others found guilty of murder." Id. at 877.
6 A few years after the decisions in the 1976 cases, Professor George Dix argued
that the Georgia Supreme Court was not meaningfully carrying out the mandate to
ensure consistency in the disposition of capital cases in Georgia. See George E. Dix,
Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. L.J. 97, 119 (1979) ("The Georgia
statute on its face does not limit mitigating evidence. But the Georgia court has been
inconsistent in determining the kinds of evidence admissible in mitigation."). The
Supreme Court could have reassessed the Georgia system in light of that failure.
Instead, in Pulley v. Harris,465 U.S. 37 (1984), the Court abandoned the suggestion
that state appellate review to ensure consistency was required. The Harris decision
concerned the absence of appellate consistency review in the California system.
Although the Court asserted that consistency review might be required if a system
lacked alternative protections against arbitrariness, the California scheme was the
same in all significant respects as the Georgia system which the Court had approved in
Gregg. See id. at 51. Therefore, after Harris, it became clear that the Georgia system
would not be invalidated even if the Georgia Supreme Court altogether abandoned
the purported practice of conducting a consistency review.
5 See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) ("In
Zant v. Stephens, we
upheld a sentence of death imposed pursuant to the Georgia capital sentencing
statute, under which 'the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any
role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its
function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for
the death penalty.' We found no constitutional deficiency in that scheme because the
aggravating circumstances did all that the Constitution requires." (citation omitted)
(quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 874)).
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for an expansive inquiry and almost unfettered sentencer choice."8
Second, a capital-sentencing scheme must slightly narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty. This narrowing can be accomplished through a requirement that a factfinder identify an aggravating circumstance either at the guilt-or-innocence trial or at the
sentencing hearings 9 If a capital-sentencing system embodies these
two requirements, it is deemed to provide the "reasonable consistency" necessary to satisfy the concerns noted by the three crucial
Justices in Furman.'

II. THE FAILURE OF "CONSISTENCY" AS A REGULATORY THEORY
While the Court has typically advanced a "nonarbitrariness" or
"consistency" rationale as the basis for regulating capital-sentencing
trials, this rationale has failed in two related respects. First, the
Court's doctrine has done relatively little to reduce the arbitrariness
that characterizes the distribution of death penalties. This is a problem of fit between doctrine and aspiration; the rules that the Court
The evidentiary inquiry is not entirely unbounded, and sentencer choice can be
limited in some minor respects. Some evidence that a party might wish to offer can be
excluded because it does not relate to the defendant's character, record, or crime.
See, e.g., Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 1987) (upholding exclusion of testimony by family members of the victim that they did not believe in the
death penalty);Johnson v. Thigpen, 806 F.2d 1243, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
argument by counsel concerning execution procedure improper because evidence
about execution procedure would be inadmissible). A state can also, for example, tell
sentencers that they must vote for the death penalty if they find an aggravating circumstance but can identify nothing they believe to be a mitigating circumstance. See
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (upholding such a state statute
because "death is not automatically imposed" and "is imposed only after a determination that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances... or
that there are no such mitigating circumstances"). A state can also tell sentencers, for
example, that they must impose the death penalty if they find that any mitigating
circumstances that they identify are outweighed in their view by the aggravating
circumstances that they identify. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990)
S

(upholding the state statute, based on the reasoning of Blystone, "because the manda-

tory language ... is not alleged to have interfered with the consideration of mitigating
evidence"). Similarly, a state can tell sentencers, for example, not to act on "mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling."
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987).
'9See Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 24445 ("We see no reason why this narrowing function may not be performed byjury findings at either the sentencing phase of the trial
or the guilt phase.").
60 See idat 246 ("There is no question but that the Louisiana scheme narrows the
class of death-eligible murderers and then at the sentencing phase allows for the
consideration of mitigating circumstances and the exercise of discretion. The Constitution requires no more.").
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has produced do not achieve the goal that the Court has articulated.
Second, the "nonarbitrariness" or "consistency" rationale lacks a
grounding in the Eighth Amendment. This is a problem of fit between aspiration and the Constitution; nonarbitrariness or consistency in the treatment of capital offenders is not a goal that plausibly
derives from a prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments."
A. The Divergence of the Court'sDoctrineftom the Consistency Theory
The most common criticism of the Court's capital-sentencing
doctrine has been that it does not produce consistent results. 6 1 The
doctrine, under this view, does not conform to the Court's stated
purpose in regulating capital sentencing. This complaint is wellfounded. The Court's capital-sentencing decisions accomplish little
in the way of ensuring that those who are convicted of capital offenses
are sentenced according to a cognizable standard.
1. Inconsistency Among Potentially Guilty Capital Offenders
When considered against a consistency goal, the Court's capitalsentencing doctrine is problematic because the doctrine applies at
only one of several stages where the choice between death and imprisonment occurs. A person who is factually guilty of a capital offense may be spared from the death penalty at the charging stage
because she is charged with a noncapital offense. She may be spared
at the pretrial stage through a plea agreement that insulates her from
the capital punishment. 62 The capital offender may also be spared at
the guilt-or-innocence stage of the trial if the trier of fact acquits her
on the capital charge despite her factual guilt.6 She may be spared in
some jurisdictions by the prosecutor's decision after conviction not to
pursue the death sentence. 64 Finally, the defendant who receives the

6'See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
62 Regarding the extent to which plea-bargaining occurs in capital cases, see
WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES 53-70 (1991).
Jurors in criminal cases may validly acquit a defendant who appears guilty,
although they are not informed of this "nullification" power. See generally Alan
Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullfication: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 52-56 (discussing jury nullification in criminal
trials).

Prosecutors have exercised this power frequently, for example, in the postFunnan Georgia system. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUALJUSTIcE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY 106 (1990)

[hereinafter BALDUS STUDY] ("[Iln 59 percent of the death
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death penalty may be spared through clemency or pardon. 65 Substantial discretion lies with the decisionmaker at each of these stages.
Given the many opportunities for arbitrary action, the distribution of
death sentences among those who have committed capital offenses
would not likely align in a tolerable pattern merely through regulation of the sentencing trial.6
The Court's decisions are not sensibly understood, moreover, as
indicating that persons convicted of capital offenses constitute the
group within which to pursue consistency. The Court has sometimes
suggested that potential arbitrariness among this narrow class is its
concern.67 However, only if regulation of the sentencing trial influenced the exercise of discretion at other stages could such a circumscribed focus make sense. The only reason to limit discretion at the
sentencing stage is to control arbitrariness in the overall selection of a
group to be exterminated. 68 Indeed, if arbitrary decisions to spare
capital offenders occur throughout the remainder of the selection
process, circumscribing sentencer discretion will do little, if anything,
to promote consistency in the distribution of death sentences.
eligible cases, a life sentence was imposed by default when the prosecutor unilaterally
waived the penalty trial.").
6' Regarding the lack of standards governing clemency decisions, see Elkan
Abramowitz & David Paget, Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
136 (1964).
This point was made in an important article on capital punishment published
shortly before the Supreme Court's Furmandecision. SeeArthurJ. Goldberg & Alan M.
Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional 83 HARv. L. REV. 1773, 1793
(1970) ("[I]t is very unlikely that essentially arbitrary and discriminatory impositions
of capital punishment can be halted.... Prosecutorial discretion at one end of the
process and executive clemency discretion at the other may be enough to preserve the
capricious character of capital punishment.").
67 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(asserting that the Furman mandate was only concerned with discretion at the capitalsentencing stage).
63 The plurality's opinion striking down the mandatory death statute in Woodson
v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), makes this point. The plurality asserted that
mandatory death-penalty statutes will likely only cause jurors at the guilt-or-innocence
stage to arbitrarily acquit some guilty capital offenders out of a belief that the death
penalty is an inappropriate sanction in the case. See id. at 302-03 (plurality opinion)
(referring to a state study which found that "juries in the State '[q]uite frequently'
were deterred from rendering guilty verdicts of first-degree murder because of the
enormity of the sentence automatically imposed" and concluding that "it is only
reasonable to assume that many juries under mandatory statutes will continue to
consider the grave consequences of a conviction in reaching a verdict" (alteration in
original)). This contention assumes that the group within which to assess whether
death sentences are distributed consistently is greater than merely those who have
been convicted of the capital offense.

1998]

EIGHTH AIENDMENT AND CAPITAL SENTENCING

813

The Court's regulation of the sentencing stage, however, could
not plausibly be thought to limit arbitrariness at other stages of the
selection process. The Court has sometimes suggested that the
strength of evidence on guilt and the applicability of sentencing
criteria favoring death will largely control the prosecutor's decisions
at the charging and plea-bargaining stages and the decision whether
to pursue the death penalty after conviction.
Empirical evidence,
however, has demonstrated the fallacy of this argument. Professor
Welsh White concludes, based on empirical evidence, that pleabargaining in capital cases is not controlled or even heavily influenced by whether a death sentence could be secured." Citing the
importance of various matters influencing prosecutors, such as local
custom, economic considerations, political concerns, and the quality
of defense counsel, Professor White concludes that "the likelihood of
a plea bargain in a capital case will be dramatically affected by factors
that have nothing to do with the nature of the crime or the strength
of the evidence against the defendant."7
Further, a well-known study of the Georgia system in the mid1980s, headed by Professor David Baldus (the "Baldus study"), determined that most capital offenders in Georgia were spared from execution at stages other than the sentencing trial, even though the
sentencing standards were so expansive as to cover almost all capital
offenses.7 Most significantly, the researchers found that, even after
winning conviction on a capital offense, the prosecutor elected not to
pursue the death penalty in approximately two-thirds of the cases.73
Hence, the notion that officials with discretion to reprieve offenders

69For example, Justice White contended in his opinion in Gregg that insufficient

evidence existed to conclude that prosecutors would base their charging and pleabargaining decisions on considerations other than whether the factflnder and sentencer would return a guilty verdict and a death sentence. See 428 U.S. at 225-26
(White,J, concurring injudgment).
70 See WHITE, supra note 62, at 54-62 (examining prosecutorial
use of pleabargaining).
7' Id at 54.
72 See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 64, at 233-34 (describing the exemption of capital
offenders due to plea-bargaining and post-conviction decisions by prosecutors not to
pursue the death penalty); id. at 268 n.31 (noting that between 1974 and 1979, 65% of
defendants convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter were eligible for the death
penalty); id at 88-89 (noting an overall death-sentencing rate of 23% of all deatheligible defendants between 1973 and 1978).
73See id.at 327 tbl.56 (noting the percentages of cases in which prosecutors sought
death sentences based on the race of defendants and victims).

814

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW

[Vol. 146: 795

outside of the sentencing hearing will follow standards applicable at
the sentencing stage is untenable. 74
The Court's capital-sentencing regulation diverges from the consistency rationale that the Court has offered to justify the doctrine. A
capital-sentencing system that only imposes decisional standards at
the sentencing phase does little to ensure the consistent distribution
of death sentences among all who are factually guilty of capital murder. Yet, the Court's doctrine does not seem logically addressed to
promote consistency even in the decisions reached at the capitalsentencing hearing.
2. Inconsistency Among Convicted Capital Offenders
The Eighth Amendment restrictions the Court has imposed on
capital-sentencing trials have essentially reproduced the pre-Furman
world of capital sentencing. 75 We have already seen that the two
principal mandates embodied in the Court's modem decisions are
the narrowing requirement and the requirement of individualized
sentencing.6 Neither of these mandates, as they have been implemented by the Court, would seem to reduce arbitrariness in the
distribution of capital punishment among those convicted of capital
offenses. As two prominent scholars of the Court's capital-sentencing
the appearance
decisions have concluded, the Court has "promot[ed]
77
of intensive regulation despite its virtual absence."

74 Standards imposed to restrict sentencer discretion to reprieve capital offenders
would seem most likely to cause officials operating at other stages to increase their use
of discretion. This view was articulated shortly after the Furmandecision:
[I]mpulses [to reprieve capital offenders at nonsentencing phases] all become stronger in a system in which discretion in the sentencing stage has
been confined. Defendants will be less willing to plead guilty to a count when
a statute makes the imposition of death probable or mandatory, and thus plea
bargaining will usually require reducing the charge. More important, the impulse to individualize treatment in nonsentencing stages becomes particularly
powerful when a major source of flexibility elsewhere in the criminal process
has been confined. Prosecutors, knowing that obtaining a capital conviction
will likely result in a death sentence, will be more inclined to reduce charges,
and pardoners may review more carefully sentences which were imposed
without any opportunity for the sentencer to be lenient.
Note, supra note 19, at 1715-16 (footnotes omitted).
75 See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 359 ("[T]he overall effect of twentyodd years of doctrinal head-banging has been to substantially reproduce the preFurman world of capital sentencing.").
76 See supraPart I.B-C.
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 438.
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a. The NarrowingRequirement
The Court's narrowing requirement, even if it amounted to a
mandate to reduce substantially the group subject to the death penalty, would not logically reduce the arbitrary treatment of convicted
capital offenders. A substantial narrowing of those eligible for the
death penalty reduces the number of persons subject to a discretionary decision to impose the death penalty. However, a narrowing of
the death-eligible group may also increase the number of unfounded
exemptions from the death penalty. Indeed, the number of persons
who warrant the death penalty but who are exempted from it through
a narrowing process could exceed the number of persons who do not
warrant the death penalty and are saved from it. Is this result preferable? Unfounded exemptions from the death penalty are as problematic as unfounded impositions of that sanction if the Eighth
Amendment mandates consistency." On this view, the reduction in
the size of the group eligible for death does not necessarily improve
the distribution of death penalties.7
On the functional level, the Court's narrowing mandate also fails
to require states to reduce significantly the group eligible for death.
The Court has examined single aggravating circumstances and at
times has concluded that they are invalid because they could reasonably be thought to describe all capital offenders." However, the
Court has never required that a capital-sentencing scheme, consid78 The Court has not suggested that there is a standard by which to assess
when a

death sentence is or is not warranted. Nonetheless, this further failing on the Court's
part only casts doubt on the notion that consistency is the goal. The notion that the

aim is a type of consistency other than the same sentence for all capital offenders
implies that there is a measure for determining when a death sentence is warranted.
See Ronald J. Allen, Foreword-Evidence,Inference, Rules, and Judgment in Constitutional Adjudication: The Intriguing Case of Walton v. Arizona, 81 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 727, 736-37 (1991) (concluding that although the absolute quantity of

"arbitrary" death sentences in a state could decrease, the number of "arbitrary" imprisonment sentences could increase so that the proportion of "arbitrary" sentencing
decisions could remain unchanged).
SeeMaynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-65 (1988) (invalidating a mandatory

death sentence imposed based on a statutory aggravating circumstance that the
murder was "'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel'" as overbroad and vague (quoting
OKiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (West 1981))); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,
432-33 (1980) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a mandatory death sentence imposed

based on a sweeping statutory aggravating circumstance because the state's highest
court failed to limit its breadth); id. at 434-35 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)

(disapproving aggravating circumstance that the murder was "'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim'" (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (b) (7) (1978))).
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ered as a whole, significantly reduce the group eligible for the death
penalty. First, the Court has never clarified the starting point from
which the reduction must occur. The Court has spoken at times of
murder as the starting point,"' but some murders are per se excluded
from death eligibility, 2 and excluding them through the narrowing
process would not amount to additional narrowing. 3 More importantly, the Court has failed to demand that a state's aggravating circumstances, considered together, significantly reduce the group eligible
for the death penalty. The narrowing restrictions, as applied by the
Court, are merely rules against vagueness applied to individual aggravators rather than rules regarding the extent of narrowing required of
systems considered as whole entities. A state could, for example,
specify more than a dozen aggravating circumstances that might
together cover virtually all capital murders, but nonetheless satisfy the
Court's narrowing restrictions. 84 Even regarding individual aggravators, the Court has not demanded significant narrowing or narrowing
with any substantive measure in mind. An individual aggravator is
valid even though it covers a huge category of murders s5 Thus, despite rhetoric suggesting a forceful narrowing command,"6 the Court
See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) (noting that the finding of
an aggravating circumstance serves to "narrow[] the class of persons convicted of
murder who are eligible for the death penalty").
82 In Enmund v. Florida,458 U.S. 782 (1982), the Supreme Court concluded
that
the death penalty was per se unconstitutional even for murder, absent a finding that
the defendant intended to or attempted to kill, or actually killed a human being. See
id. at 797-98. In Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the Court reduced the group of
murders that were per se exempted from the capital punishment. The Court concluded that the death penalty was permissible for one who did not intend to or attempt to kill, or actually kill, if the prosecution could establish "major participation in
the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life." Id. at 158.
u The Court also at times has implied that the starting point is the group that is
not per se excluded from the death penalty, which is not the same category as those
who have been convicted of murder. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244
(1988) ("To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must 'genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty... .'" (quoting Zant, 462 U.S.
at 877)).
84 For example, the relevant statute currently in force in California specifies 21
'special circumstances" that, together, cover the vast majority of capital murders. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1997).
8' It is common for states to specify as an aggravating factor that the murder was
committed while the defendant was engaged in, or an accomplice in, or attempting to
commit a variety of felonies. See, e.g., id. § 190.2(a) (17) (listing twelve felonies).
86 In Zant, the Court declared that a capital-sentencing scheme must
"genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify
the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found
guilty of murder." 462 U.S. at 877.
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has never demanded through the narrowing mandate that capitalsentencing systems substantially circumscribe the group subject to
87
execution.
Indeed, states have not understood the Court's command against
vague aggravators as requiring that their systems substantially narrow
the death-eligible group or that they pursue any particular theory for
deciding who dies. In Georgia, for example, the state legislature set
out a list of ten aggravating circumstances in its post-Furman statute.
Some of the aggravators were subsequently struck down as being too
vague.8 Nonetheless, the Baldus study, which was performed in the
mid-1980s, determined that ninety percent of the pre-Furman Georgia
cases in which the death penalty was imposed would still fall under at
least one of the valid aggravating circumstances included in the new
sentencing scheme. 9 Hence, the combination of aggravating circumstances has not greatly reduced the number of persons subject to a
possible death sentence. Further, the murderers who are spared by
the narrowing process are hardly all persons who appear to warrant
an exemption. A sniper who stalks and kills her victim for revenge
with a high-powered rifle would not qualify for the death penalty.
However, a person who contracts for such a killing,91 or who kills the
87 As for the antivagueness command regarding individual aggravators, the Court
has also shown reluctance in recent years to invalidate rather vague aggravators. See
Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1993) (approving an aggravating circumstance
requiring a finding that "[b]y the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life" because of narrowing
construction by state court requiring a finding that the defendant was a "cold-blooded,
pitiless slayer"). For criticism of the Court's decision in Creech, see Susan RaekerJordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme Court's Evolving
Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455, 535 (1996)
("[T]he majority erred in refusing to admit that the term 'cold-blooded' can be
applied to many cases that fit outside the definition constructed by the majority.").
8 See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975), quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 165 n.9 (1976) (plurality opinion).
89 See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (noting
that descriptive factors such as "outrageously or wantonly vile" and "horrible or
inhuman" were insufficiently definite to sustain the requirement that a death sentence
be based on "reason rather than caprice or emotion"); id at 434-35 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment) (disapproving an aggravating circumstance that required the
jury to find that the murder was "'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim'"
(quoting GA. CODE. ANN. § 27-2534.1 (b) (7) (1978))); Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386,
391-92 (Ga. 1976) (invalidating an aggravating circumstance requiring thatjury find "a
substantial history of seriously assaultive criminal convictions").
,o See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 64, at 102.
, See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b) (6) (1997) (defining as an aggravating circumstance that "the offender caused or directed another to commit murder").

818

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVJEW

[Vol. 146: 795

same victim for money, 2 would face possible execution. Why should
these distinctions matter? Further, Georgia, like many other states,
uses felony murder as a narrowing device.93 Some felony murderers
are highly dangerous. However, the felony-murder class includes
"not only cold-blooded killers but accidental killers and attenuated
accomplices," 94 hardly the worst murderers. Hence, it appears that
the Georgia aggravators provide a far too limited and haphazard
system of narrowing to reduce substantially the inconsistency of death
sentences compared to those resulting when jurors are not required
to find an aggravator. 9s
b. The Requirement ofIndividualized Sentencing
The Court's command that states allow for the rejection of the
death penalty based on a consideration of a broad array of perceived
mitigating circumstances also would not logically promote consis-

tency in the distribution of death penalties. The argument in favor of
the broad individualization mandate is that sentencers have the opportunity to consider much more information about the offender
than under the typical pre-Furman system and that this additional
information will lead them to make betterjudgments. 97 However, the
absence of any standards to guide jurors in the use of the sentencing
evidence evokes doubt that the results would align with some acceptable measure. Sentencers are not even told what question they are
supposed to answer when they consider the alleged mitigating and
aggravating evidence. Are sentencers to ask whether the defendant
deserves the death penalty? If so, should they consider only the
defendant's culpability for the murder or, instead, the defendant's

See id. § 17-10-30(b)(4) (defining as an aggravating circumstance that "[t]he
offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose of
receiving money").
93See id. § 17-10-30(b) (2) (defining as an aggravating circumstance that the
murder occurred during the commission of certain other felonies).

Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth AmendmentJurisprudence of Death,
31 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (1990).
9'For a more favorable view of the narrowing impact of Georgia's statutory aggravators, building on the view that the Court was much more concerned with overinclusion than underinclusion in the death-eligible group, see McCord, supra note 11, at
577.
For a discussion of the Court's broad individualization mandate, see supra notes
32-51 and accompanying text.
97 See McCord, supra note 11, at 577-78.
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"general deserts" or "moral merit"0 -based

on all of her life's works?"
Alternatively, perhaps sentencers should ask a utilitarian question,
such as whether the defendant poses a future danger if not executed.
Yet, even if sentencers miraculously agreed across cases on what
general question to ask, they likely would not concur on the answer to
be given in particular cases. The answers given after the broad, individualized inquiry may well turn as much on the values of the sentencers involved as on the evidence presented. 0
The view that the broad individualization mandate conflicts with
the consistency command has been widespread among commentators10' and the Justices themselves.1 2 On this view, as the number of
1 coined these terms in an earlier article to describe a broad deserts inquiry
I3
which the Court's decisions in Lockett and its progeny arguably allow. See Scott W.
Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323, 351 (1992) (explaining that the terms "moral merit"
and "general deserts" refer to an inquiry into "the offender's deserts based on all
aspects of his life").
99The broader, "general deserts" assessment incorporates an assessment of the
offender's "culpability" for the capital crime. See Carol S. Steiker &Jordan M. Steiker,
Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing,
102 YALE L.J. 835, 847 (1992) (reviewing BEVERLY LOWRY, CROSSED OVER (1992))
("Evidence of positive character traits and past good works may reveal a defendant's
'general desert[s]' and contribute to a moral assessment of the defendant's entire life
that includes, but is not limited to, the defendant's culpability for the crime.").
'00See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
'' See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 39, at 1001 ("Commentators have often remarked
that Furman's mandate of consistency and Woodson's mandate of individualization
compete with one another at some level.").
'2 See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972-73 (1994) (noting that the objectives of the selection decision and eligibility decision "can be in some tension" when
the inquiries occur at the same time); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1994)
(explaining that states have been required to perform "two somewhat contradictory
tasks" in order to impose the death penalty); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 114142
(1994) (Scalia,J., concurring in denial of certiorari) ("[T]he Court has attached to the
imposition of the death penalty two quite incompatible sets of demands: The sentencer's discretion to impose death must be closely confined, but the sentencer's
discretion not to impose death (to extend mercy) must be unlimited." (citations
omitted)); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(noting the tension between the Court's decisions which both require consideration
of mitigating circumstances and prohibit allowing sentencers unguided discretion in
imposing the death penalty); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (explaining that the constitutional
objective enunciated in Furman cannot be achieved simultaneously with the constitutional objective enunciated in Woodson and Lockett); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164,
181-82 (1988) (plurality opinion) (noting that two lines of cases, one suggesting
unlimited discretion and the other requiring limits on discretion, are in tension with
each other); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 544 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("This case squarely presents the tension that has long existed between the two central
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factors deemed potentially relevant at the sentencing inquiry grows,
the potential for consistency according to an identifiable measure
declines. Conversely, as the effort to achieve consistency is pursued,
either through death penalties mandatory upon conviction or
through channeling sentencing standards, the sentencer's freedom to
consider mitigating and aggravating evidence will shrink. Nonetheless, the Court has concluded that the Eighth Amendment mandates
broad individualization, even in cases where the defendant is convicted of a murder with highly aggravating circumstances. 0 3
c. EmpiricalStudies

The Court also has been impervious to challenges to its capitalsentencing doctrine based on studies of post-Furman sentencing
schemes indicating that substantial arbitrariness remains.' ° The
Baldus study, which was used in litigation before the Court,"5 focused
on the Georgia system in the decade after the Court first sanctioned
the resumption of capital punishment. 11 The Baldus study demonstrated continuing arbitrariness in the distribution of death sentences
and, in particular, racial discrimination based predominantly on the

principles of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
622 (1978) (White, J., dissenting in part) (describing the plurality's holding that "the
sentencer may constitutionally impose the death penalty only as an exercise of his
unguided discretion after being presented with all circumstances which the defendant
might believe to be conceivably relevant" as a complete "about-face" from Furman's
command against arbitrariness); id. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part) ("If a
defendant as a matter of constitutional law is to be permitted to offer as evidence in
the sentencing hearing any fact, however bizarre, which he wishes, even though the
most sympathetically disposed trial judge could conceive of no basis upon which the
jury might take it into account in imposing a sentence, the new constitutional doctrine
will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of sentences, but will
codify and institutionalize it.").
103See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 85 (1987) (invalidating
a statute
requiring mandatory death penalty for life-term inmates who commit murder);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637-38 (1977) (per curiam) (striking down the
death penalty imposed pursuant to the mandatory death-penalty statute on the murderer of a police officer).
'0' Numerous studies from many states reveal a pattern of sentencing in capital
cases influenced heavily by the race of the victim. See Ronald J. Tabak, Is Racism
Irrelevant? Or Should the Fairnessin Death Sentencing Act Be Enacted to SubstantiallyDiminish RacialDiscriminationin Capital Sentencing?, 18 REV. LAW & SOC. CHANGE 777, 780-83
(1991) (noting a national pattern of discrimination in capital sentencing based on the
race of the victim).
10o See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
1 See generallyBALDUs STUIJy, supra
note 64.

1998]

EIGHTHAMEND)MENT AND CAPITAL SENTENCING

821

race of the victim.' 0 7 The researchers found, initially, that a convicted
murderer of a white victim was much more likely to receive the death
penalty than a convicted murderer of a black victim. 0" Professor
107

The Baldus researchers conducted two studies of the capital-sentencing system

in Georgia. Their original study, dubbed the Procedural Reform Study (the "PRS"),
aimed to test for arbitrariness in both pre- and post-Furmancases at two stages of the
death selection process-the decision of the prosecutor whether to pursue death after
conviction and the sentencing decision of the jury. See id. at 42. This effort was
problematic in that it was unclear how to judge whether a sentencing decision was
arbitrary as opposed to appropriate; the Supreme Court has never provided consistent
direction even as to the basic nature of the judgment to be rendered by a capital
sentencer. In deciding when sentencing results were arbitrary as opposed to acceptable, the researchers, therefore, were required to rely heavily on their own values as to
how capital-murder cases should be judged. See id. at 84 (explaining evidence of
excessiveness in terms of what the researchers considered excessive or evenhanded).
The conclusions of the PRS were subject to challenges based on the subjectivity of
judgments underlying them. See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race,
Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1432-33 (1988)
(disagreeing with the Baldus researchers' assessment of propriety of the death penalty
in McCleskey, discussed infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text).
After completing the PRS, the researchers decided to conduct a second study,
dubbed the Chargingand Sentencing Study (the "CSS"), which focused mainly on how
racial discrimination influenced the flow of cases from indictment to sentencing. See
BALDus STUDY, supranote 64, at 45. The idea of "arbitrariness," which was the focus of
the PRS study, was difficult to pin down and, therefore, difficult to measure. The
notion of "discrimination" based on race, however, connoted a clearer problem.
Through the use of regression analysis, employed after detailing scores of characteristics of all cases in the study, the researchers could make relatively persuasive conclusions about the influence of racial factors on outcomes. The CSS also measured for
racial discrimination from the point of indictment all the way to the jury's sentencing
decision. See id.at 45-46.
i's For all persons charged with murder in Georgia between 1973 and 1979, the
Baldus researchers found the following death-sentencing rates in comparing categories accounting for the race of the defendant and victim:
Race of Defendant & Victim
Death Sentencing Rates
1. black defendant/white victim
.21 (50/233)
2. white defendant/white victim
.08 (58/748)
3. black defendant/black victim
.01 (18/1443)
4. white defendant/black victim
.03 (2/60)
TOTAL
.05 (128/2484)
See BALDUS STUDY, supranote 64, at 315 tbl.50.
Note that the race of the victim correlates with death sentencing rates more than
the race of the defendant does. The death sentencing rates for cases involving white
victims are much higher than the rates for cases involving black victims. Within the
category of white victim cases, however, there is a large disparity in death sentencing
rates corresponding to the race of the defendant. Within this category, black defendants receive death sentences at a much higher rate than white defendants.
While the possibility of hidden variables coincidentally corresponding to racial
variables means that these results do not prove that race matters, the results may be
persuasive to many observers. The possibility that acceptable, nonracial factors could
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Baldus and his colleagues employed sophisticated statistical analysis
to determine if this outcome was explainable by factors other than
race. However, after accounting for more than 200 nonracial variables that might have influenced the sentencing decisions, 109 the
researchers determined that the race of the victim continued to exert
a powerful influence on the capital-sentencing decision. According
to the study, because of the race of the victim, a convicted murderer
of a white victim was 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty
than a convicted murderer of a black victim.1
As for race-ofdefendant discrimination, the researchers found no overall discrimination against black defendants in the totality of post-Furman cases;"'
however, within the white-victim cases, they determined that a black
defendant was 2.4 times more likely to receive a death sentence
than
112
a white defendant because of the race-of-defendant factor.
Lawyers used the Baldus study on behalf of a black inmate, Warren McCleskey, who had been sentenced to death in Georgia for
murdering a white police officer.13 McCleskey's counsel argued that
the Baldus study warranted invalidating his death sentence as violative
of both equal protection and the Eighth Amendment.14 In a five-tofour decision, the Court rejected both claims."5 The equal-protection
claim failed, the majority concluded, because McCleskey had not
established with the Baldus evidence purposeful discrimination by his
prosecutor orjury.1 6 The Eighth Amendment claim failed essentially
because nonarbitrariness in the Eighth Amendment sense is preexplain the differences may appear doubtful. The Baldus researchers sought to
identify any such hidden factors.
'0Although the authors amassed data for approximately 230 characteristics, see id.
at 46, and used one model that controlled for 230 variables, statistical analysis revealed
that a 39-variable model best explained the sentencing patterns observed, see id at 316.
The authors note that the problem of overlapping variables, causing the misstatement
of the influence of certain variables, made the use of the model with fewer variables
more appropriate. See id. at 457-58.
"o See id. at 316.
".
11

See id. at 328.

See id.

SeeMcCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 283 (1987).
'"

See id. at 286.

"5 See id. at 299 (rejecting McCleskey's equal-protection claim); id. at 319 (holding
that the statistics put forth by McCleskey did not establish violation of the Eighth
Amendment). The majority consisted ofJustice Powell, writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. The dissenters were
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
"6 See id. at 292 (stating that equal-protection violation requires proof "that the
decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose").
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sumptively established, the majority declared, by a state's compliance
with the Court's Eighth Amendment doctrine governing capital
sentencing."7 In a troubling demand for certitude," 8 the majority
also declined to concede that the Baldus statistics established that the
Georgia
119 system produced results infested with improper racial influences.
Of course, the majority was therefore unwilling to acknowledge that its regulation of capital sentencing had failed to produce an
appropriate pattern separating convicted murderers who received the
death penalty from those who were spared. 2
In the final analysis, the Court's stated theory for regulating capital-sentencing trials has not heavily influenced the doctrine that it has
produced. The Court has only required that the sentencer identify
an aggravating circumstance before the defendant becomes deatheligible and that the sentencer subsequently have discretion to reject
the death penalty based on information offered by the defendant
about her character, record, and crime. These requirements cannot
plausibly be thought to promote substantial consistency in the distribution of death sentences among all factually guilty capital offenders
or even among those actually convicted of capital crimes.1
The Court noted at one point:
Because McCleskey's sentence was imposed under Georgia sentencing
procedures that focus discretion "on the particularized nature of the crime
and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant," we lawfully
may presume that McCleskey's death sentence was not "wantonly and freakishly" imposed, and thus that the sentence is not disproportionate within any
recognized meaning under the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at 308 (citations omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976)
(plurality opinion)).
Although subsequently addressing McCleskey's claim that the Georgia capitalpunishment system was arbitrary and capricious in application, the majority essentially
relied on the contention that the Baldus study did not "prove that race enters into any
capital sentencing decisions or that race was a factor in McCleskey's particular case."
It
For further analysis of this portion of the majority's opinion, see RANDALL
KENNEDY, RAcE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 335-39 (1997).
1 SeeKennedy, supra note 107, at 1389 ("[T]he majority in McCleskey repressed the
truth and validated racially oppressive official conduct.. ").
" See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312 ("At most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy
that appears to correlate with race."); i&eat 313 ("[We decline to assume that what is
unexplained is invidious.").
'20 This was the aim of capital-sentencing regulation that the Court had repeated
on more than one occasion. Seesupranote 25.
121 Many commentators have previously reached this conclusion.
See, e.g., Vivian
Berger, "BlackBox Decisions" on Life orDeath-IfThey're Arbitrary,Don't Blame theJury: A
Reply to Judge PatrickHigginbotham,41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1067, 1091 (1991) (noting
that "actual holdings [from the Supreme Court] premised on the goal of avoiding
arbitrary executions have become a form of endangered species"); Steiker & Steiker,
17
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B. The Divergence of Consistency Theory from
Eighth Amendment Values
If the Court's doctrine fails to promote substantial consistency in
the use of the death penalty, we should ask whether the consistency
mandate is grounded in the Eighth Amendment. In fact, the Eighth
Amendment is not appropriately understood to require consistent use
of the death penalty. The problems with imposing such a mandate
under the Eighth Amendment help to clarify why the Court has not
seriously pursued it.
A mandate of consistency assumes that the Eighth Amendment
requires no particular substantive standard by which to separate those
who receive the death penalty from those who are spared. This mandate assumes that there are many appropriate patterns for distributing death penalties. Thus, while a state could not use standards that
violate other constitutional prohibitions, such as those against racial
discrimination or inhibitions on free speech, states would retain wide
authority under the Eighth Amendment to control the capital sentencer's exercise of discretion. Nonetheless, if the mandate is consistency, a capital-sentencing scheme should provide a "'meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not."''1
Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment to require consistency,
however, is misguided. If the Eighth Amendment required consistency, a system involving unrelenting harshness in the imposition of
death sentences should succeed, while a system giving officials discretion to extend merciful reprieves should fail. Following this reasoning, the protection against "cruel and unusual punishments," would
require, or at least allow, mandatory death penalties. Courts also
would need to regulate the decisions of prosecutors and other state
officials at all stages of the death-selection process to ensure that they
did not allow persons who were death eligible to escape the death
penalty without good reason. If the function of the Eighth Amendment is to ensure consistency in the separation of those who receive
the sanction from those who are spared, regulation should focus on
all phases of the overall selection process. The aim is to ensure that

supra note 3, at 402-03 (stating that "the fact of minimal regulation ... invites if not
guarantees the same kinds of inequality as the pre-Furmanregime").
122 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (plurality opinion) (alteration in
original) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
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all offenders who meet a certain standard receive the death penalty as
much as it is to ensure that those who do not meet the standard are
spared. On this view, many murderers, perhaps even all of them,
should suffer execution; their execution, as opposed to a merciful
exemption from death, would protect them from cruel and unusual
punishment. The profound irony of this conclusion suggests the
implausibility of the consistency theory as an appropriate Eighth
Amendment principle.'23
The consistency view of the Gruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause lacks a foundation in history. The view finds no support in the
pre-Furman holdings of the Supreme Court. Moreover, the view lacks
support in the historical evidence surrounding the inclusion of the
Clause in the Amendment.124 Although the purpose of the prohibition in the minds of the promulgators is uncertain,'2 serious dispute
has never encompassed the notion that the Clause was intended to
mandate consistent treatment of offenders. The genuine debate has
focused on whether the Clause was only intended to prohibit certain
forms of punishment or whether it was also intended to prohibit punishments that, although sometimes permissible, are disproportionately severe in context. 2 The Supreme Court has now quite clearly
adopted the view
• that
• 127 the Amendment should be understood to carry
proscriptions.
both

2 See Daniel P. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972
SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 27 (noting that pursuing nonarbitrariness in capital sentencing under
the Eighth Amendment implicates a "profound contradiction").
124 See generallyAnthony F. Granucci, "NorCruel and UnusualPunishments Inflicted":

The O7ginalMeaning,57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 842-44 (1969) (defining the debate over the

original understanding of the Clause as whether certain forms of punishment were
prohibited or whether punishments that were disproportionate to the charged offense
were also or instead proscribed).
'25 See Furman,408 U.S. at 263 (Brennan,J., concurring) (noting that the import of
the Clause at the time of its adoption is indefinite).
'
See Phillip E. Johnson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME ANDJUSTICE 575, 575 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) ("The history of the clause

provides no conclusive answer to the recurring question of whether its American
authors meant only to bar certain barbarous punishments altogether or whether they
also meant to ban penalties, not unlawful per se, that are disproportionate to the
crime.").
1 See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-98 (1982) (holding the death
penalty impermissible for a defendant convicted of felony murder who did not intend
to, attempt to, or actually kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding

that the death penalty, although sometimes permissible, was disproportionate punishment for Coker's crime and, therefore, violative of the Eighth Amendment); see also
sources cited infra note 137.
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Assuming the Eighth Amendment properly bans disproportional
death sentences, that command does not call for consistency in the
distribution of death sentences. A disproportionality command
means that only persons who warrant the death penalty can receive
that sanction. The protection does not mean that all persons who
warrant the death penalty must receive it. Moreover, the offender
who warrants the death penalty and receives it does not warrant the
penalty any less because some others who also warrant the death
sentence escape it.12s Indeed, to claim that the prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishments mandates consistency is to obscure the true
question to be addressed under the Eighth Amendment: When does
a capital offender warrant the death penalty? The Court should ask
whether there is a substantive Eighth Amendment value that determines when a death sentence is just.
The troubling problem of racial disparities in the use of the death
penalty does not change the mandate of the Eighth Amendment.29
The Eighth Amendment proscribes the imposition of the death penalty on those who do not warrant it. Unless disparities justify a conclusion that those who receive the death sentence do not warrant it,
racially based inconsistencies are irrelevant. For example, the Baldus
study indicated that, in Georgia, killers of white victims were much

'2 See Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV.

1662, 1663 (1986) ("To put the issue starkly, if the death penalty were imposed on

guilty blacks, but not on guilty whites, or, if it were imposed by a lottery among the
guilty, this irrationally discriminatory or capricious distribution would neither make
the penalty unjust, nor cause anyone to be unjustly punished, despite the undue
impunity bestowed on others.").
'29 A state's unequal treatment of capital offenders, of course, undermines its
capital-sentencing scheme when that inequality violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is possible for all offenders who receive the death penalty to warrant it in Eighth
Amendment terms even though the selection process violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, the Supreme Court has concluded that there must be an
intent to discriminate based on an improper basis before a Fourteenth Amendment
violation arises. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (stating that a
defendant who raises an equal-protection claim must establish "'the existence of
purposeful discrimination'" (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967))).
One may disagree with this view of when disparate treatment should be actionable
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Charles R Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 35558 (1987) (contending that even unconscious racism should be actionable under the
Fourteenth Amendment). Nevertheless, the goal of consistency in applying the death
penalty may actually support increased use of the death penalty and the imposition of
a greater percentage of death sentences on minority defendants. See infra notes 256-58
and accompanying text.
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more likely to receive the death penalty than killers of black victims.' 0
That some
Studies in other states have produced identical findings.
who warrant the death penalty escape that sanction, however, does
not mean that others who are sentenced to death do not warrant
death.'3 2 While a situation can be hypothesized in which societal
consensus rejects the imposition of death sentences as uniformly
public sentiment about
unwarranted, that does not appear to describe
33
the death penalty in the United States.
One may contend that improper racial considerations typically, if
not inherently, infect death-penalty determinations, but this is neither a problem best understood as inconsistency nor a reason for
further regulation of capital sentencing. This contention takes issue
with the inability of decisionmakers to free themselves from improper
considerations in pursuing a substantive Eighth Amendment standard
for deciding when a death sentence is just." To prevail, the argument must establish that persons who do not warrant execution un-

See supranotes 108-10 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, PatternsofDeath: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 105
(1984) (noting that race-of-the-victim disparities in the distribution of death penalties
in the post-Furman systems of eight states "is a remarkably stable and consistent phenomenon").
132 An offender warrants the death penalty even if many others
who are similarly
situated do not receive that sanction. As explained more fully in Part III, I believe that
the pertinent Eighth Amendment value focuses on offender deserts, which are assessed based on the offender's character, record, and crime. See infra text accompanying notes 162-65. Of course, we cannot judge the deserts of an offender except by
reference to our experience ofjudging the deserts of others. See LLOYD L. WEINREB,
NATURAL LAW ANDJUSTICE 244 (1987) ("Unable to reason from a general principle to
specific applications, we build up a picture of the world from innumerable concrete
instances; we learn how to regard one case after another and extend that learning to
other similar cases."). Nonetheless, that many murderers who do not receive a death
sentence are similarly situated to a defendant who receives it does not undermine the
conclusion that the condemned offender deserves such a penalty.
' See WHITE, supra note 62, at 24 (noting that recent polls reveal the public to be
.overwhelmingly in favor of the death penalty"); Garvey, supra note 39, at 1047
(concluding based on recent polls and legislation that "the public's strong support for
capital punishment shows little sign of abating").
'34See, e.g., Interview by Ian Gray & Moira Stanley with Alan M. Dershowitz, Professor at Harvard Law School, in Cambridge, Mass. (Mar. 2, 1988) [hereinafter
Dershowitz], in A PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME 330, 331 (Ian Gray & Moira
Stanley eds., 1989) (asserting that "[1]egal rules do not determine who gets executed,"
but rather a variety of factors irrelevant to the deserts of the offender generally determine capital-sentencing outcomes).
"
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der the Eighth Amendment are executed.' 5 In reality, this is an
argument for eliminating capital punishment altogether rather than
merely supervising capital sentencing. As we will see, the Court is
unable to determine precisely who warrants the death penalty, and
therefore, cannot define with accuracy those cases where the death
penalty is just.'m Consequently, if one finds that racial prejudices
generally infect death-penalty decisions, abolition, not regulation, is
the appropriate remedy.
In the final analysis, the Court's oft-stated rationale for regulating
capital-sentencing trials since Furmanlacks a grounding in the Eighth
Amendment. A prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" is
not violated when offenders who warrant the death penalty escape it,
but rather when offenders who do not warrant the death penalty
receive it. The ironic outcome of long-term efforts to use the Eighth
Amendment to apply the capital punishment consistently helps explain why the Court's purported focus on consistency remains more a
rhetorical flourish than a guiding principle for deciding cases.
III. THE SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF THE DESERTS-LIMITATION
THEORY OF REGULATION

Although the Supreme Court has failed to articulate an Eighth
Amendment rationale for regulating capital-sentencing trials, the
question remains whether one exists. This Part explains that there is
a principle plausibly drawn from the Eighth Amendment that could
govern the capital sentencer's decision. Nonetheless, this principle
fails on prudential grounds to provide a rationale for such regulation.
The relevant principle is that only those who deserve the death penalty
should receive it. The deserts-limitation principle explains the function of a capital-sentencing hearing and provides a standard to guide
the capital sentencer. Nonetheless, the principle loses its prescriptive
power at a high level of generality. Because of the inability to refine
the principle into relatively precise decisional standards or rules of
evidentiary relevance, the Court cannot appropriately use it to regu-

...
Based on the Court's view of the need to identify an enduring societal consensus against the death penalty, see infra text accompanying notes 158-60, the Court
effectively would have to find that there is a widespread view that those sentenced to
death do not deserve that sanction. I do not believe that such a view exists and am
doubtful that it would exist even if the racial disparities involved in capital sentencing
were widely known.
'm See infra text accompanying notes 175-77.
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late procedure at capital-sentencing hearings or even to require those
hearings.
A. The Explanatory Power of the Theory
The principle that only offenders who deserve death should receive that sanction embodies the core restriction that the Constitution imposes on the use of capital punishment. This desertslimitation idea establishes that utilitarian considerations should not
factor in the ultimate decision about whether an offender warrants
the death penalty. A particular murderer may be extremely dangerous and offer little prospect for future contributions to society. Nonetheless, under the deserts limitation, she should not be condemned
to death unless she deserves this sanction. This basic principle, rather
than being a command for consistency, explains the underlying
features of the Court's capital-sentencing doctrine.
A prohibition on undeserved capital sentences assumes that the
Eighth Amendment proscribes not only punishments that are barbarous in form, but also those that are unduly severe in context. Although this proposition has been disputed, the Supreme Court long
ago determined that the Eighth Amendment prohibits dispropor7
tionate penalties as well as those deemed inherently inhumane.3
The Court has never retreated from this position.

7 In 1910, in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), the Court concluded that
the prohibition covers a sanction that is excessive in application even though not
proscribed per se. Weems was a Philippine official who had been convicted under
Philippine law for falsifying a public document. See id. at 357-58. He was sentenced to
cadena temporal which involved at least twelve years of hard labor, perpetual supervision, and loss of his civil rights. See id. at 363-64. Justice McKenna, writing for the
Court, struck down these penalties as cruel and unusual. He referred to the extreme
and unusual nature of the accessory forfeitures, as well as to the excessive imprisonment imposed. See id. at 366. The opinion also suggested that the Court thought that
the sanctions were not per se improper but, instead, only improper based on the
crime committed by Weems: "Such penalties for such offenses amaze those
who.., believe that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to offense." Id. at 366-67.
Some have doubted that the outcome in the Weems case would have been the same
if only the prison sentence had been involved, suggesting that the Court viewed the
accessory forfeitures to be proscribed per se. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, Making the
PunishmentFit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1075-76 (1964) ("[I]t was the combination of an excessive but conventional mode of punishment with a good deal of laid-on
unpleasantness... that supported the characterization of Weems' punishment as
cruel and unusual."). Three members of the current Supreme Court also believe that
the Eighth Amendment is best understood as only proscribing modes of punishment.
See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 488 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he

830

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW

[Vol. 146: 795

In assessing proportionality, the Court has acted on the view that
offender culpability or blameworthiness for the capital crime is the
appropriate standard in the capital context. In Coker v. Georgia, the
Court concluded that death was always disproportionate to "a rape
not involving the taking of life. " ss After noting that death was an
uncommon punishment for rape, Justice White, writing for a fourJustice plurality, 39 declared that determining whether capital punishment was excessive punishment for rape was ultimately left to the
discretion of the Court. 4 The retributive basis for the plurality's
conclusion was clear. Justice White emphasized that the invasion of
personal interests involved in rape, although serious, was not commensurate with the taking of life itself.14' Justice White did not men-

better view is that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was intended to place
only substantive limitations on punishments."); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
976 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) ("[T]he Clause disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or 'modes' of punishment.").
Despite room for debate, a substantial majority of the Court recently agreed that
Weems correctly identified a prohibition in the Eighth Amendment against disproportional penalties. See id. at 997 (Kennedy, J.,joined by O'Connor & Souter, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("Our decisions recognize that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause encompasses a narrow proportionality principle.");
id. at 1009 (White, J., joined by Blackmun & Stevens, .JJ., dissenting) (arguing that
while the Eighth Amendment does not explicitly refer to "proportionality," it clearly
would be cruel and unusual "to impose any punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the offense for which the defendant has been convicted").
'a' 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (plurality opinion).
139 Three otherJustices agreed with the judgment, one on narrower grounds, but
two on broader grounds. Justice Powell concluded that the death sentence in Coker's
particular case was excessive, but was unwilling to agree that death was always excessive
for rape. See id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) ("[1]t may be that the death penalty is not disproportionate punishment for the
crime of aggravated rape."). Justices Brennan and Marshall each separately concurred
on grounds that the death penalty was unconstitutional in all circumstances. See id. at
600 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and usual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."); id. (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) ("The death penalty, I
concluded, is a cruel and usual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
140 See id. at 597 (plurality opinion) ("[Olur own judgment will be brought
to bear
on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.").
4 See id. at 598 (plurality opinion) ("The murderer
kills; the rapist, if no more
than that, does not."). The opinion implied that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional for most crimes that did not involve "the taking of human life." Id.
(plurality opinion).
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tion that punishing rape with death might serve utilitarian ends.'42
The plurality opinion also indicated that Coker's responsibility for the
rape at issue was the only proper measure of retribution. Although
Coker had a horrendous record of murder and rapes, and was a
prison escapee when he committed the charged offense,'4 3 Justice
White stated that those prior crimes did not affect the impropriety of
the capital punishment. ' " Thus, the opinion indicated that capital
punishment is limited by the moral culpability of an offender for the
charged offense, uninfluenced by the societal benefits of executing
her. Further, the Court's subsequent applications of the Coker doctrine have continued to rest on retributive ideals, although the Court
also has emphasized the need to examine whether the death penalty
is rarely applied in the relevant category of cases. ' 4
Mandating and closely regulating a capital-sentencing hearing
might be considered an effort to pursue the same principle that
animates the Coker doctrine. If the death penalty is inapplicable to
categories of offenses in which the offender is insufficiently deserving,
as Coker held, the offender's deserts, based on individualized facts,
should also limit the imposition of the sanction. For example, the
range of deserts of persons convicted even of aggravated murder is
wide, and arguably, not all of them deserve the death penalty. According to this view, a sentencing hearing would allow evaluation of
the deserts of the individual offender. Further, because dozens, or
even hundreds, of factors might affect the deserts evaluation, the
needed inquiry could not be adequately addressed by the definition
of a capital offense. For this reason, a capital-sentencing hearing
142

Cf. Packer, supra note 137, at 1079-81 (noting that if the desire to deter other

future offenders or to incapacitate the convicted criminal justifies the death sentence,
then rape is rationally punished with the death penalty).
" In his dissenting opinion, which pointed to the utilitarian benefits of executing
Coker, ChiefJustice Burger emphasized Coker's horrible record and his escape from
prison to commit the charged crime. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
141 See id. at 598-99 (plurality opinion) (stating that "these prior
convictions do not
change the fact that the instant crime being punished is a rape not involving the
taking of life").
,45See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal offender."); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 382
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasizing
that an appropriate Eighth Amendment analysis requires a consideration of whether
there is a nexus between the punishment and the offender's blameworthiness for the
crime); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 336 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting the
same language from Tison).
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would be essential. The individualized inquiry allows a refined assessment of deserts in order to ensure that no person is sentenced to
death who does not warrant that sanction.
The deserts-limitation principle does not require that all capital
offenders who deserve death receive this sanction. Instead, the principle only requires that those who do not deserve the sanction be
spared. The deserts-limitation theory is not concerned with consistent treatment of capital offenders. Even if most people who deserve
death only serve prison sentences, the death sentences that do issue
would not be cruel and unusual. As long as offenders who receive the
death penalty deserve it, they could
not claim that their punishment
1 46
violates the Eighth Amendment
Although the Court espouses a "consistency" theory for regulating
capital sentencing, in most ways its capital-sentencing holdings are
best explained by appeal to the deserts limitation. First, the desertslimitation principle could explain why the Court has not regulated all
stages of the capital-selection process.1 4
A goal of consistency in
capital sentencing only makes sense as part of an effort to protect
against arbitrariness throughout the capital-selection process."
By
contrast, even without regulation at other stages, requiring a sentencing hearing to assess deserts can be thought to help ensure that all
capital offenders who receive a death sentence deserve it.
The deserts-limitation principle also can help explain some of the
Court's doctrine that regulates the sentencing trial. First, the theory
can provide some support for the Court's requirement that a sentencing hearing be held in every capital case, even if the state defines the
1 The Eighth Amendment plausibly can be interpreted to proscribe undeserved
death penalties. The intended meaning of the prohibition against "cruel and unusual

punishments" is uncertain, as we have seen. See supranotes 125-26 and accompanying
text. However, the concept that a person should not suffer an undeserved death
sentence coincides with shared notions of justice. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH,
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 45 (1976) ("Ask the person on the
street why a wrongdoer should be punished, and he is likely to say that he 'deserves'
it."); John Hospers, Retribution: The Ethics of Punishmen4 in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL
181, 183 (Randy E. Barnett &John Hagel I1 eds., 1977) (contending that, for most

people, the idea of treating criminals in accordance with their "deserts" embodies the
very notion ofjustice). According to this view, undeserved death sentences constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion) (asserting that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
"draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society").
117

See supra Part II.A.1.

"" But see supra Part II.A (arguing that the "nonarbitrariness" rationale for capitalsentencing regulations is not supported by the Court's rulings).
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capital crime in highly specific terms. 149 This argument suggests that
a proper deserts assessment can only be achieved through an individualized sentencing inquiry encompassing potentially dozens of
factors. Based on this view, the state cannot mandate death even for
aggravated crimes defined in narrow terms.
The deserts theory, more than the consistency doctrine, alsojustifies the narrowing command embodied in the Court's capitalsentencing doctrine. As we have seen, the Court has concluded that a
state must have narrowing factors, however minimal, that reduce the
size of the group potentially subject to the capital punishment' 50 As
previously discussed, this requirement makes little sense if the goal is
consistency in the distribution of death sentences.'5 ' If the goal is to
protect against retributive excess, however, distilling the group that is
eligible to receive death to the more deserving serves that purpose.
Eliminating offenders whose crimes involve no aggravating factors
diminishes the chances that an undeserving offender will be sentenced to death.
In addition, the deserts-limitation theory, unlike the consistency
theory, explains the Court's mandate of broad, individualized consideration. The Court has required that the capital sentencer remain
free to reprieve a capital offender based on any mitigating evidence
that the offender presents regarding her character, record, or
crime. 5 2 If consistency is the goal, this requirement is illogical since it
opens the door for sentencers to react without channeling standards
to a broad swath of potentially mitigating information, making it
more likely that the outcome will be controlled by the values of the
particular sentencer rather than the influence of the evidence presented. By contrast, if the deserts-limitation principle drives the
inquiry, inconsistent sentencing outcomes are not necessarily problematic. As long as the practice helps to spare offenders who do not
deserve the death penalty, it serves the theoretic goal.
Another much-discussed conflict in capital-sentencing cases also
disappears if regulation is based on a deserts limitation rather than
consistency concerns.
The Justices themselves have frequently

," See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82-85 (1987) (rejecting mandatory
death statute as applied to murder by an inmate serving a life term); Roberts v. Louisi-

ana, 431 U.S. 633, 637-38 (1977) (rejecting mandatory death penalty for the murder of
a police officer).
'0 See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
.51
See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
152 See supra Part I.B.
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claimed that there is a "tension" between the Furman command of
"consistency" and the requirement of individualized consideration
embodied in Lockett and its progeny.5 The existence of a true tension is undermined, however, by the lack of any continuing controversy about what a state must do to create a constitutional system of
capital sentencing.1 4 States need only require the finding of murder
plus one aggravating factor and subsequently allow for unbridled
consideration of mitigating circumstances. 5 The Court has never
imposed, except rhetorically, a mandate that states promote
"consistency." The purported conflict exists only in the language of
the Court's opinions, not in the schemes the Court has approved.
Substituting the deserts limitation for consistency as the regulatory
theory, moreover, solves even this rhetorical conflict. Harmonization
is possible because a theory of deserts limitation justifies rather than
undermines individualized consideration.
The Court's capital-sentencing doctrine, however, does not conform entirely to the deserts-limitation theory.
The Court has not,
for example, required that aggravating circumstances focus on offender deserts as opposed to utilitarian questions, such as the offender's propensity for future violence. The Court has not required
that the evidence or argument presented be limited to information
bearing on deserts; prosecutors are free to offer evidence of future
dangerousness and to urge execution, for example, to spare prison
guards from the offender's future violence. The Court has not even
required that capital sentencers be advised about the substantive
question to be resolved at the sentencing hearing. Thus, sentencers
may legitimately vote for death based on the perceived benefits of
execution to the community rather than on the deserts of the of-

"' See supra note 102 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 371 ("[I]f a state sought to design a
capital statute from scratch today, it could easily avoid federal constitutional difficulties and, perhaps more tellingly, could do so without departing significantly from the
statutory schemes struck down in Furman.").
154

...See supra Part I.B-C.
136The

Court has stated several times in recent years that the individualization
requirement stems from the need to assess offender culpability. See, e.g., McKoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 443 (1990) ("'[lIt is precisely because the punishment
should be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant that the jury
must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a
defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense.'" (quoting Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989))). However, the Court has never required
that jurors be told of the substantive question to answer regarding culpability, or that
evidence and argument of counsel be limited by the culpability standard.
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fender. These inconsistencies could be remedied by the Court and,
indeed, the Court should have pursued these problems when it rejected mandatory death statutes and regulated capital-sentencing
hearings under the Eighth Amendment. Despite the failure of the
Court to pursue the deserts theory, careful consideration of the difficulties the Court would have encountered by pursuing it is warranted.
B. The Failure of the Theory on PrudentialGrounds
Ultimately, the deserts-limitation principle fails as a theory by
which to regulate capital sentencing. Although some would surely
disagree, I contend that the fatal flaw is not with the basic notion that
the Eighth Amendment commands that the death penalty be limited
to those who deserve this punishment. As discussed above, the deserts theory provides a plausible interpretation of the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishments. As an explanation of a mandated
capital-sentencing inquiry, the deserts notion wins by default; no
other theory can explain why the Eighth Amendment always com57
mands a sentencing inquiry as a prerequisite to a death sentence.1
The deserts principle also bears on what a capital sentencer should
decide at the capital-sentencing hearing and, for that reason, provides
a theoretical basis for regulating the inquiry. Although the desertslimitation principle is morally justified in the abstract, and explains
some current Court practice, prudential reasons render the theory a
failure. I believe that the Supreme Court cannot legitimately refine
the deserts-limitation command sufficiently to justify controlling, or
even requiring, the capital-sentencing hearing. For this reason, I
conclude that the effort begun with Furman to regulate capital-

,-, Providing individualized consideration, through holding a sentencing hearing,
does not automatically render a death sentence more humane. The hearing could
only protect against a disproportional death sentence to the extent that it resolves
some particular inquiry required by the Eighth Amendment as a prerequisite to a
death sentence. Some commentators have concluded, however, that the Supreme
Court's cases may mean that individualized consideration renders a death sentence
acceptable without regard to the questions resolved at the hearing. See, e.g., RonaldJ.
Mann, The Individualized-CansiderationPrinciple and the Death Penalty as Cruel and UnusualPunishmen4 29 HOus. L. REV. 493, 515-16 (1992) (suggesting that individualized
consideration is the sole constitutional requirement, regardless of the rationality of
the results). Although I contend that such a position would be unfounded, I concede
that the Court's incoherence in capital-sentencing decisions suggests that the Court
does not believe that any particular question more specific than whether the offender
is to be executed must be answered.
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sentencing procedure under the Eighth Amendment was destined to
fail.
The problem stems from the proposition that the Court should
interpret the Eighth Amendment in accordance with societal values.
The Court has concluded that "the Amendment recognizes... the
'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."" s Some may decry this approach on formalist grounds as
too "activist." But at least this approach recognizes the Court's duty
to restrict its review under the Eighth Amendment to enforcing humanitarian limits on punishment that are sufficiently clear as to warrant a finding of an enduring societal consensus. Room for argument
remains about how to identify the relevant societal consensus. 9 Still,
when confronted with a vague clause like that prohibiting "cruel and
unusual punishments," the effort to pursue society's deeper values
appears to be the most appropriate approach to the Court's necessary
task of articulating moral values.' 6
The difficulty for the Court in pursuing the deserts limitation in
regulating the capital-sentencing trial is that no evident consensus
exists as to how to refine the deserts measure.'r It may be intuitive
that societal members generally believe that those who do not deserve
the death penalty should not receive it. However, the consensus
dissolves over how to refine the deserts measure in a way that can
justify the Court's ignoring legislative judgments about how to structure the capital-sentencing hearing.
Initially, it is uncertain even at what level deserts are to be measured. Should the required assessment be of the offender's "culpability" for the capital crime, or instead, of her "moral merit"-her
"general deserts"-determined by evaluating anything morally good
or bad that she has done in her life?162 A culpability inquiry would ask
only about the offender's "blameworthiness" or personal "responsibil-

1
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
"9For criticism of the societal-consensus methodology in constitutional interpretation, seeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACYAND DISTRUST 63-69 (1980).
'60 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Speakable Ethics and ConstitutionalLaw: A
Review Essay, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1523, 1543 (1989) ("Ajudge should seek to interpret
the community's values and bring them to bear on constitutional interpretation .... ").
161 See WEINREB, supra note 132, at 217 ("Desert... is not often put to the test of

specificity and even resists it.").
'62 For discussion of the origin and meaning of these terms, see supra notes 98-99
and accompanying text.
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ity" for the capital crime.'6 This inquiry would start with the details of
the crime and the defendant's involvement. It would also allow evidence of the defendant's background and character to the extent of

inquiring whether factors external to the offender's responsible self
so influenced her involvement in the crime as to reduce her culpability.2' A host of factors might be proffered to the sentencer about the
defendant's past and about her emotional and mental condition.
However, the evidence and inquiry would be restricted by the limited

purpose of assessing the offender's responsibility for the capital offense.'6
In contrast, if the required assessment is at the level of the offender's general "moral merit," all of the good and bad that she has
produced and the motivations behind her life's works bear weight.
The defendant could introduce evidence, for example, that she had
won medals for valor during military service, that she had excelled in
artistic endeavors, and even that she had been affectionate with dogs.
In response, the prosecutor could detail all of the defendant's prior
bad acts, ranging from major offenses to such minor matters as the
failure to show respect to employers. Prior good and bad deeds
would not bear on the narrow question of the offender's culpability

'0 Professor Wise has helpfully described how this inquiry would go beyond the
culpability assessment involved in the conclusion that the defendant is guilty:
Culpability for purposes of sentencing .... seems to imply the relevance of
considerations usually ignored when one has to say guilty or innocent, with
no ifs and buts allowed. It may be taken to imply a somewhat greater concern
with subjective, inner states of mind and feeling than is convenient or conventional in most legal contexts.
Edward M. Wise, The Concept ofDesert 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1343, 1353 (1987).
'" This showing might include:
[E]vidence that... the defendant's personal responsibility is lessened by
youth, stunted intellectual and emotional growth, mental retardation or impaired capacity, mental or emotional disturbance, provocation by others, insanity, the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense .... [and]
evidence... that the defendant suffered tragic or horrible circumstances in
his or her formative years, such as abuse, neglect, poverty, or domestic turbulence ....
Louis D. Bilionis, MoralAppropriateness, CapitalPunishment, and the Lockett Doctrine 82
J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 302-04 (1991) (footnotes omitted); see also Gary
Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 324 (1983) (asserting that defense counsel must inquire "into the
client's childhood, upbringing, education, relationships, friendships, formative and
traumatic experiences, personal psychology, and present feelings").
'0 There is no single theory of culpability, however. On this score, see infra text
accompanying notes 170-72.
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for the crime. However, the sentencer should be made
aware of these
66
factors if the goal is to judge the offender's "soul."'
It is not intuitive which measure of deserts ought to determine a
capital offender's fate. Commentators have disagreed whether the
Eighth Amendment notion of deserts speaks to a measure that is
broader than offender culpability.167 While extending the inquiry
beyond offender culpability renders it difficult to control, limiting the
inquiry to culpability does not seem to comport with societal consensus. If culpability were the only relevant measure, prior crimes for
which the offender had served her sentence arguably would have no
influence on the capital sentencer's decision. Prior crimes for which
one has served the sentence arguably lack any bearing on one's culpability for a later crime.'66 Yet, it is not clear what most people would
conclude about whether the offender's prior crimes should be included in the capital-sentencing inquiry. Likewise, a culpability focus
would mean that the offender could not, for example, introduce
evidence that she had saved a jail guard from a fatal stabbing while
incarcerated pending trial on the capital charge. A defendant's good
deed unrelated to the crime would not bear on her culpability for
that crime. Yet, a consensus may well exist that an offender's unusual
act of valor should
be weighed in assessing her deserts at the sentenc69
ing hearing.1

'6 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 18 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977)
(asserting that the function of criminal courts over time has transformed from a mere
.apportioning of responsibility" for the crime to a broader assessment of the of-

fender's "soul").
17 Compare Goodpaster, supra note 164, at 303 (asserting that a "central
issue" of
the inquiry "is the meaning and value of the defendant's life"), and Howe, supra note
98, at 350-58 (arguing for dual inquiries into culpability and general deserts), with
Garvey, supra note 39, at 1022-29 (contending that the inquiry should focus on culpability and that the mandated inquiry under Lockett is arguably too broad), and Steiker
& Steiker, supra note 99, at 858 (contending that the societal consensus is too sketchy
beyond the culpability measure).
" See Howe, supranote 98, at 352 n.114 (describing a variety of theories regarding
the relevance of past crimes at sentencing).
6 The Court's plurality decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), implied
that the capital sentencer should be required to find that the defendant's culpability
alone warrants the death penalty. Although Coker had committed prior crimes,
including two rapes and a murder, and had escaped from prison to commit the rape
for which he was tried, the plurality found that the offender's deserts regarding the
charged offense should limit his eligibility for death. See id. at 598-99 (plurality opinion). The Coker decision does not, however, mean that the culpability finding would
alone be sufficient to justify a death sentence. Rather, sufficient culpability could be
one of two findings required as the prerequisite to a death sentence. The sentencer
could also be required to find that, on the question of general moral merit, the
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Even if the Court could legitimately choose culpability over moral
merit, doubt would remain over how to refine a culpability measure.
Philosophers cannot agree on the basic explanation for when a person becomes morally responsible for an act or how to measure that
responsibility." They certainly cannot agree on how to determine
when a partial excuse sufficient to reduce a death sentence to a
prison sentence should adhere. 7 ' Are actors generally free from
determinism and, for this reason, culpable? If so, why is an actor ever
only partially culpable? If all acts are determined, when are actors
still sometimes culpable, and under what circumstances? If determinism prevails, when would actors be only partially culpable? Philosophers have given a wide array of answers to these kinds of questions.ln
In light of their disagreements, little basis exists to conclude that the
citizenry has reached a consensus about how to scale the moral culpability of capital murderers.
Moreover, it is doubtful that consensus exists about the relative
amount of retribution involved in the competing sanctions of imprisonment and death, since citizens disagree about the amount of suffering accompanying a long prison sentence.'7 Judgments here must
take account of the particular offender, for what may bring severe
suffering for one may cause little hardship for another. The citizenry
may be even less certain what retribution is achieved with death.
Indeed, some may doubt that execution is more punitive than a long

offender deserves death. The question the Court would have to answer, its proportionality decisions suggest, is whether there is a societal consensus against executing a
defendant whose overall moral merit indicates that she does not deserve death. See
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 99, at 839 n.18 (asserting that an analysis based on
societal consensus employed in "proportionality" decisions such as Coker "can be
employed to determine which evidence is constitutionally relevant to the capital
sentencing decision, even where such evidence does not categorically preclude
imposition of the death penalty").
'" See generally Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the IndividualizationMandate in Capital
Sentencing. Darrow'sDefense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1012-24 (1994)

(discussing disagreement among contemporary philosophers as to Clarence Darrow's
argument that no person is culpable, and thus, no person deserves punishment).
" See generally id. at 1024-28 (explaining that analysis of the first-level inquiry into
who should properly be punished based on Darrow's arguments leads to difficulties in
formulating a theory for grading the severity of punishment due those deemed
punishable).

,7 For a discussion of criminal-law theorists' views about the criminal law's acceptance of excuses, see id. at 1028-36.
173 See John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CAL. L. REV. 59, 89 (1987) (asserting that a
"dissensus" exists among both jurors and judges as to the "weights" to be accorded
"the consequences of prison and death").
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prison term. 7 4 These disagreements cast further doubt on the notion
that consensus exists about how to judge when a capital offender
deserves death.
Current capital-sentencing doctrine underscores that the Court
views itself as unable to provide standards for deciding which offenders deserve death. The Court's narrowing doctrine does not attempt
to define who is death eligible. Although the Court has required the
identification of an aggravating factor, it has not clarified what is
aggravating, and has not required that a sentencing system as a whole
significantly narrow the group of eligible offenders.175 Further, the
Court's broad individualization mandate only means that, after death
eligibility is established under state standards, sentencers must remain free to reject the death penalty based on evidence the offender
offers concerning her character, record, or crime. Capital sentencers
receive no channeling standard to help them resolve which offenders
deserve the death penalty. The Court's decisions generally indicate
that such an effort to channel the sentencer's decision would violate
the Eighth Amendment.1 6 The sentencer must remain largely
unre77
evidence.
proffered
defendant's
the
of
use
her
in
stricted
The inability to define who deserves the death penalty undermines the Supreme Court's effort under the Eighth Amendment to
regulate the capital-sentencing trial, or even to require the proceeding. Assume a defendant has been convicted of an aggravated murder, such as intentionally killing a police officer. We should ask why a
state legislature lacks the authority to mandate the death penalty
upon conviction for this crime. To conclude that the death penalty is
inappropriate without considering the offender's background, character, and crime assumes that there may be factors that reduce the
17 See Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency:
FordingMurky
Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 58 n.231 (1992) (asserting doubt that execution is always more punitive than life imprisonment and noting that several prominent
writers "have viewed life imprisonment as a worse fate than death").
',- See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 96-100, 103 and accompanying text.
177 In its effort to define when a defendant is actually "innocent of the death

penalty" and, thus, may be allowed a departure from the normal rules governing
federal habeas corpus petitions, the Court also has declined to address when a death
sentence is truly warranted. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992). The
Court has concluded that, as long as the existence of at least one aggravating factor
still remains clear, new evidence bearing on sentencing cannot establish that the
offender is "innocent" of the death penalty. See id. at 345-47 (rejecting the argument
that the offender should be permitted to show the existence of additional mitigating
evidence to establish her "innocence of the death penalty").
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offender's deserts, rendering the death penalty undeserved. However, unless the Court can specify the standards to be applied by the
sentencer, the only real issue is who decides how deserts should be
measured. It remains unapparent why individual sentencers should
be able to decide for themselves how to define deserts, which is the
effect of the Court's doctrine. The basis for disqualifying the legislature from providing the standards disappears if the Court itself cannot articulate Eighth Amendment standards that should control the
sentencing decision.
The Court's rejection of legislative judgment as to appropriate
sentencing standards is all the more strange
given
its conclusion that
S
178
single judges may serve as capital sentencers.
It is particularly unapparent why a single judge should be allowed to decide what line
separates those who warrant the death sentence from those who do
not when the legislature is disqualified from doing so. The failure to
provide standards requires the sentencing judge not only to decide
whether the defendant falls within the category of offenders warranting death, but also to define the category. If political processes render the legislatures untrustworthy to define the category appropriately, it is ironic that the Court would authorize states to turn the
process over to a single judge. In death-penalty states, judges are
often elected and face severe political pressure in death-penalty
179
cases.

'78

The Court has repeatedly rejected claims that a jury rather than a judge must

perform the capital-sentencing inquiry and decision. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990) (rejecting the argument that the Sixth Amendment requires a
jury trial on the sentencing issue of life imprisonment or death); Clemons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990) ("Nothing in the Sixth Amendment as construed
by our prior decisions indicates that a defendant's right to a jury trial would be infringed where an appellate court invalidates one of two or more aggravating circumstances found by the jury, but affirms the death sentence after itself finding that the
one or more valid remaining aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating evidence.");
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per curiam) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the
sentence of death be made by the jury."); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984)
(concluding "that there is no constitutional imperative that ajury have the responsibility of deciding whether the death penalty should be imposed"); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (plurality opinion) (explaining that jury sentencing in a capital
case is not constitutionally required).
179 See generally Stephen B. Bright & PatrickJ. KeenanJudges and the Politicsof Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV.
759, 760 (1995) ("[U]npopular decisions in capital cases, even when clearly compelled
by law, may cost ajudge her seat on the bench, or promotion to a higher court.").
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The argument that sentencing jurors or judges will do no worse
than the legislature in refining the rules for identifying felons who
deserve the death penalty is not persuasive. First, for the same reason
that the Court cannot identify sentencing rules, the Court cannot
determine the extent to which sentencing jurors and judges apply
correct standards for determining offender deserts. No standard of
measurement exists because no consensus exists, articulable in relatively precise rules, about when a death sentence is deserved. Moreover, the argument shifts the burden in the wrong direction. If the
Court cannot articulate fairly specific rules, derived from the Eighth
Amendment, governing when a death sentence is deserved, the default decision should go to the legislative judgment. Again, the argument is about who should identify the rules of decision, and, given
the desire to pursue societal values, a large body elected by the citizenry to represent it would appear better than ajudge or ajury."s
The Court's doctrine has, moreover, substantially constricted legislative options on capital sentencing. It is possible that many legislatures, even without Supreme Court action, would have enacted and
maintained capital-sentencing systems similar to those called for
under the Court's doctrine. It should be noted that, even before
Furman, there was an evolving movement by state legislatures toward
the sort of sentencing approach that the Court subsequently required
in the decisions that followed Furman.'s Many state legislatures might
well have further narrowed the application of the death penalty even
without Furman, and most probably would have allowed fairly broad,
individualized consideration. This does not mean, however, that all
180 Cf. ELY,

supra note 159, at 68 (arguing that the Court is not a better representa-

tive of societal values than a national legislature).
'8' When Furmanwas decided, a majority of states still employed a unitary trial in
capital cases, but a trend was developing toward employing a bifurcated sentencing
hearing that would allow for the presentation of more evidence bearing on the
sentencing issue. California and Pennsylvania adopted bifurcated trials in the late
1950s. See Note, California and Pennsylvania Courts Divide on Question of Admissibility of
Details of PriorUnrelated Offenses at Hearing on Sentencing Under Split Verdict Statutes, 110

U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1038-39 (1962). Connecticut, New York, and Texas adopted
bifurcated trials during the 1960s. See Charles J. Judson et al., Project, A Study of the
CaliforniaPenaltyJuiy in First-Degree-MurderCases, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1297, 1307 & n.10,

1432-38 (1969). In 1970, Georgia adopted a procedure involving a separate sentencing hearing at which the prosecutor could introduce evidence of the defendant's prior
record. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 64, at 8 n.t (noting that Georgia was one of a
few states that adopted a bifurcated system before 1972). Shortly before Furman was
decided, Florida adopted a bifurcated procedure so that both sides could offer evidence relevant to sentencing at a separate sentencing trial. See Ashley v. State, 265
So. 2d 685, 692 (Fla. 1972) (pointing to legislative enactment of the new procedure).
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states would have employed broad, discretionary sentencing or that
only those systems should be approved. States should have been
permitted to experiment with other approaches.
In sum, the deserts limitation cannot be refined to the point of
regulating a capital-sentencing trial. The capital sentencer should
consider evidence of the offender's deserts and render a judgment
that involves a deserts finding as a prerequisite to any death sentence.
Yet, to the extent that the legislature defines the standards for resolving who will receive death, the legislature simply becomes the sentencer. The Court cannot deny that legislative standards appropriately should define deserts without explaining why the legislative
standards fail. The Court's capital-sentencing decisions underscore,
however, that the Court is unable to define who deserves death.
IV.

WHAT'S LEFr AFTER DEREGULATION OFTHE
CAPITAL-SENTENCING TRIAL?

The deregulation of capital sentencing under the Eighth
Amendment does not equate with the constitutional deregulation of
capital punishment. The Court has pursued, and might still legitimately pursue, constitutional fairness in capital-punishment systems.
The Court's requirements of narrowing and broad, individualized
sentencing consideration have actually provided rationalizations for
failing to impose adequately other legitimate restrictions on the death
penalty. Eliminating the narrowing and individualization doctrines
would encourage rethinking how the Constitution, particularly the
Eighth Amendment, might plausibly be understood to regulate the
use of capital punishment.
A. The ProportionalityDoctrine
The Court's most important weapon against improper use of the
death penalty is embodied in its proportionality doctrine. As previously noted, a four-Justice plurality used this mandate in Coker v.
Georgiato proscribe the death penalty for rape.lr 2 In Coker, the plurality strongly implied that the death penalty was per se inapplicable to
most serious crimes that did not involve the taking of human life,

"2 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text (discussing Coker).
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such as burglary or robbery, even if committed while armed.'83 The
plurality found that the death penalty amounted to retributive excess
Subsewhen compared to the culpability associated with rape.
quently, the Court has held the death penalty categorically impermissible for certain murderers who fall within the fringe of the felonymurder doctrine. In Enmund v. Florida, the Court held the death
penalty impermissible for one guilty of felony murder who did not
intend to, attempt to, or actually kill."' In Tison v. Arizona, the Court
largely eviscerated the Enmund rule by allowing the death penalty
even for offenders who fell within the Enmund exception as long as
they exhibited reckless indifference to human life and were major
participants in the underlying felony. 86 Nonetheless, a few murderers
remain categorically exempt from the death penalty on the ground
187
that they do not deserve that sanction.
By emphasizing that rape was among the most serious of crimes, but nonetheless one that did not involve "the unjustified taking of human life," Coker, 433 U.S. at
598 (plurality opinion), the plurality implied that other serious crimes in which life
was not taken were also per se impermissible bases for a death sentence. The opinion
did not foreclose, however, the possibility that situations might remain in which the
death penalty would apply although no one died, such as for crimes producing a great
risk of harm to many people.
183

114 Although the plurality pointed out that Coker's crime involved the "rape of an
adult woman," id.at 592 (plurality opinion), its reasoning would also apply to the rape
of a child. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 45 n.31 (2d ed.
1995) ("Language in Coker suggests that the decision is limited to the rape of adult
women, but its reasoning clearly applies to rape of children, as well.").
18 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) ("[W]e have the abiding conviction that the death
penalty.., is an excessive penalty for the robber who, as such, does not take human
life."). This view of the Enmund standard was confirmed four years later in Cabanav.
Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384-86 (1986). Bullock also made clear that the finding could be
made by a reviewing court rather than by the sentencer. See id. at 386 ("[T]he decision whether a sentence is so disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment.., has long been viewed as one ... an appellate court is fully competent to
make.").
(holding that "major participation in the felony
185 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987)
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy
the Enmund culpability requirement").
187 In Ford v. Wainwrigh4 477 U.S. 399 (1986), the Court also banned the execution
of insane prisoners. The Ford decision did not bar the execution of those who were
insane at the time of their offense but subsequently recovered. It held, instead, only
that one cannot be executed while insane. This decision was grounded, however, not
simply on an interpretation of contemporary standards of decency, but also on the
conclusion that execution of the insane was considered inhumane at the time of the
founding and that the Eighth Amendment proscribes acts of punishment considered
indecent when the Bill of Rights was adopted. See id. at 405-10, 409 (explaining that
today, as well as during the 18th century, civilized societies reject "killing one who has
no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity").
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While some of the Court's proportionality decisions have helped
to ensure that only the deserving receive capital punishment, they
have also helped to reduce the influence of race on the distribution
of death penalties. In the decades before Furman, the most pronounced racial disparities existed for the crime of rape, in which the
death penalty was imposed disproportionately for the rape of a white
woman by a black defendant.'82 In fact, the racial disparity in the
distribution of death sentences in rape cases apparently spurred the
campaign against the death penalty in the 1960s. In 1963, Justice
Goldberg wrote a dissent from a denial of certiorari in Rudolph v.
Alabama,19 a case in which a black man had been sentenced to death
for raping a white woman. In that dissent, joined by justices Douglas
and Brennan, Justice Goldberg raised questions about the constitutionality of the death penalty for rape. 90 Although Justice Goldberg
did not discuss
the racial disparities, they apparently were his central
191
concem.
It was the dissent in Rudolph that helped spur the campaign by lawyers
att the
Legal Defense Fund that ultimately
• ,
• • NAACP
192
led to the Furmandecision.
After the Court authorized the resumption of the death penalty in 1976, and Georgia attempted to enforce
its new death-penalty statute for rapes, the Supreme Court reached
"s SeeJames Kt Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Death Penalty Cases: Citation
Practicesand Their Implications, 8 JUST. Q. 421, 431 (1991) (noting cases where socialscience materials were presented to the Court to highlight the discriminatory application of the death penalty in rape cases); see also MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 75 (1973) (noting that
between 1930 and 1967, 405 of 455 death sentences for rape were imposed on black
men).
189 375 U.S. 889 (1963).

'9 See id. at 889-90 (Goldberg,J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (questioning
whether imposing the death penalty for rape violates standards of decency).
191 Professor Dershowitz, who wasJustice Goldberg's clerk that year, has stated that

the racial disparities were the justice's primary concern:
We had done a study and had found four hundred or so cases in which people were sentenced to death for rape. It was always a black man sentenced to
death for raping a white woman. So we took that case to ask if the Court
would simply like to consider the question.
Dershowitz, supranote 134, at 331.
192 See Eric L. Muller, Note, The Legal Defense Fund's Capital Punishment Campaign:
The DistortingInfluence of Death, 4 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 158, 166-67 (1985) (asserting
that the Rudolph dissent was one of several factors that caused lawyers at the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund to begin to focus on attacking the constitutionality of the death
penalty); see also Dershowitz, supra note 134, at 331 (asserting that after Dershowitz
sent copies of the dissenting opinion in Rudolph to Professor Anthony Amsterdam,
who worked closely with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, "Tony picked up the ball
and ran with it and started the campaign against the death penalty, which culminated
in Furman").
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the central question presented by the Rudolph dissenters in Coker. By
holding the death penalty per se improper for most nonhomicide
offenses, particularly rape, the Court eliminated a category
of death
93
disparities.
racial
of
history
pernicious
a
with
eligibility
The Court could appropriately have enforced the proportionality
doctrine more vigorously than it has since Coker to help ensure that
only deserving capital offenders receive death sentences. In rejecting
claims of group disproportionality, the Court may well have considered the existence of individualized consideration by the capital
sentencer as a reason to be less concerned about the need to draw
categorical prohibitions. 94 If, however, individualized consideration
is not deemed constitutionally required, the extent to which the
Court might appropriately extend the categorical exemptions warrants rethinking.
1. Possible Applications of the Proportionality Doctrine
There are several ways in which the Court should extend its proportionality doctrine. First, the Court should prohibit the death
penalty for any offender under eighteen years of age at the time of
her offense. The Court has rejected, by a close margin, the argument
that the death penalty is per se excessive retribution for sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old offenders.9 5 However, the number of offenders

'93

The Court could have done much more, however, to confine the use of the

death penalty for felony murder, which could have further reduced the racial disparities in the distribution of death sentences. See infra note 224.
'94 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (plurality opinion) (rejecting a
categorical prohibition on the execution of mentally retarded offenders, in part
because "[s]o long as sentencers can consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of
mental retardation in imposing sentence, an individualized determination whether
'death is the appropriate punishment' can be made in each particular case").
...See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (5-4 decision) ("We discern
neither a historical nor a modem societal consensus forbidding the imposition of
capital punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age.").
The Court has yet to articulate an age below which a state may not execute minors.
A year before Stanfor, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the Court, by a
narrow margin, concluded that the death penalty was excessive for 15-year-old offenders because Oklahoma's capital-punishment statute failed to specify a minimum age at
which the commission of a capital offense could lead to a death sentence. See id. at
857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that criminal offenders
below the age of 16 should not be executed under a statute that failed to provide a
minimum age for execution, because it was apparent that the Oklahoma legislature
did not carefully consider the issue). The Court failed to conclude, however, that the
execution of a 15-year-old was altogether impermissible under the Eighth Amend-
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under eighteen who are sentenced to death is proportionally small,
thus underscoring the widespread sense that minor offenders generally lack the culpability to deserve the death penalty.' 0 Although
several states allow the execution of minors,' 97 the small number of
minor offenders sentenced to death may suggest that those who
receive it have been carefully screened by sentencers. ' " Yet, the same
kinds of arguments were available in Coker. Several state legislatures
had revealed their willingness to authorize the death penalty for
rapists.'99 The proportion of rapists sentenced to death in Georgia
also was not terribly small. ' °° Nonetheless, the four-Justice plurality
rejected the death penalty for rapists by emphasizing that the question of evolving decency was ultimately one for the Court.'0 ' Under
ment. See id. at 858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (leaving the question
to state legislatures).
' See Victor L. Streib, ExcludingJuvenilesfrom New York's Impendent Death
Penalty,54
ALB. L. REV. 625, 658 (1990) (noting that executions of persons for crimes committed
while they were under age 18 have constituted only about 2.4% of all executions).
197The state of the law at the time that the Supreme Court considered the question is described injustice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Stanford See Stanfora, 492
U.S. at 384-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that 12 states prohibited the death
penalty for offenders under the age of 18, that three states did not authorize death for
those under 17, that 15 states did not allow the death penalty at all, and that 19 states
had the death penalty without any age restriction).
'" The majority of the Court adopted this view in rejecting the claim for a categorical exclusion of the execution of youthful offenders in Stanford See id. at 374
("[I]t is not only possible, but overwhelmingly probable, that the very considerations
which induce petitioners and their supporters to believe that death should never be
imposed on offenders under 18 cause prosecutors and juries to believe that it should
rarely be imposed.").
19 Louisiana and North Carolina had enacted death-penalty statutes applicable
to
rape after Furmanand several others had simply refrained from including rape in the
mandatory death-penalty statutes that they had passed to attempt to comply with
Furman. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 614-15 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(explaining that, because of the uncertainty following Furman, many states have
refrained from enacting statutes imposing death for the rape of an adult woman).
In his Cokeropinion, Justice White noted that the available evidence from the
post-Furman period in Georgia indicated that approximately 10% of all persons
convicted of rape were sentenced to death. See id. at 597 (plurality opinion) (noting
that at least nine out of ten juries have not imposed the death sentence in rape cases).
20 Justice White noted:
"These recent events evidencing the attitude of state
legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly determine this controversy, for the
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear
on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 597 (plurality opinion).
It is not certain whether the objective evidence in Cokerwas sufficient, but only as a
prerequisite to further the disproportionality inquiry by the Court, or insufficient to
show disproportionality, but overridden by the Court's own judgment of disproportionality.
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the same reasoning, the Court justifiably could have outlawed the
execution of minor offenders as cruel and unusual punishment.
The Court should also limit the death penalty to a narrower category of murder. The Justices have done little to exclude lowculpability murderers in the felony-murder category from death
eligibility.22 Only those offenders brought within the outskirts of
felony murder through doctrines of vicarious liability may be protected and, even then, only when they clearly have not acted recklessly or were not substantially involved in the felony. 2°s The existence
of a broad sentencing inquiry at which sentencers may grant reprieves
helps to rationalize the Court's failure to provide more per se protection. If the capital-sentencing hearing is not required, however, the

category of death eligibility should be narrowed appropriately. Limiting the use of the death penalty to murderers who kill intentionally,
or kill while intending serious bodily harm, would help to reserve the
use of the death penalty to the most culpable murderers.
The Court should also extend the proportionality doctrine to forbid the execution of those who were insane 214 at the time of their

m For an excellent discussion of the problem, see Rosen, supra note 94, at
1140-63.
200 The extent of these protections was articulated in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137
(1987), which modified the earlier holdings in Enmund v. Florida,458 U.S. 782 (1982),
and Cabanav. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986). For further discussion of these decisions,
see supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
Insanity has been defined in various ways, and the prevailing definition in this
country has changed over time. The first generally accepted definition was the
M'Naghten test announced by the English House of Lords. See M'Naghten's Case, 8
Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). Under the M'Naghten test, a person was insane if he was
operating under such defective reasoning caused by a mental disease so as: (1) not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was performing; or (2) if he did know the
nature and quality of the act, he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. See
id. at 722. The M'Naghten test of insanity was begrudging, and a few states supplemented it with an "irresistible impulse" test. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48
Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844) ("[T]he question will be... whether the prisoner.., acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse ... .").

In the early

1950s, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia enacted a much
more lenient test of insanity that focused on whether the defendant's act was the
"product of mental disease." Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir.
1954). This highly problematic test was later abandoned by the District of Columbia
Circuit. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("We have
decided to adopt the ALI rule as the doctrine excluding responsibility for mental
disease or defect... ."). The District of Columbia Circuit, like many other jurisdictions, adopted the "substantial capacity" test, proposed by the American Law Institute.
See id. (discussing the adoption of the ALI's test that "'[a] person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if... as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality ... of his conduct or to conform his
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capital offenses.0 5 The Court has not ruled on this contention, but
the issue has become potentially important because several deathpenalty states have abandoned insanity as a defense to conviction on
206
the capital charge.
This means that, under current sentencing
doctrine, the defendant's claim of insanity would only constitute a
factor for the jury to consider at the sentencing proceeding. Yet, even
if the defendant were thought to have been insane at the time of the
offense and, on that basis, generally not thought deserving of death,
the sentencer could impose the death penalty. The existence of
individualized consideration would not ensure that a particular sentencer would focus on offender deserts or, if so, measure deserts
consistently with generally existing values. The problem would be
even more obvious if individualized sentencing were not required by
the Eighth Amendment. The Court should conclude that the execution of one who committed an offense while insane is per se prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
The Court could also appropriately extend a per se safeguard for
mentally retarded offenders. In Penry v. Lynaugh,207 the Court rejected
a mildly retarded capital offender's claim for categorical protection.
The Court justified this conclusion, in part, on the ground that
Penry's retardation was not serious, as underscored by his jury's conclusion that he was both competent at the time of trial and sane at the

conduct to the requirements of the law'" (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 401.1(1)
(1962))). In the early 1980s, however, after the insanity acquittal ofJohn Hinckley for
the shooting of President Reagan, Congress passed a statutory definition of insanity

for the federal courts that reverted largely to the M'Naghten test. Under the federal
statute, a defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that, due to "severe"
mental disease or defect, she was unable to "appreciate" either (1) the nature and
quality of her conduct or (2) the wrongfulness of her conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 17(a)
(1994). For a discussion of the various definitions of insanity and their histories, see
DRESSLER, supra note 184, at 316-24.
205 The Court proscribed the execution of one who is insane
at the time of execution in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408-10 (1986), but that holding did not cover
offenders who were insane at the time of their offense but later regained their sanity.
These states have abolished insanity as an affirmative defense, but allow defendants to present evidence of a mental illness or defect to negate the existence of the
mental state specified in the definition of the crime. SeeIDAHO CODE § 18-207 (1997);
MONT. CODEANN. § 46-14-102 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (1995). Under
these statutes, a murder defendant could argue, for example, that she was hallucinating due to a mental illness and, therefore, did not realize that she was killing a person,
implying, in turn, that she lacked the requisite mental state.
207 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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time of the offense. 28" The problem with the Court's contention is
that the proportionality problem concerns not whether the defendant
should receive immunity from conviction, but only whether he should
be protected from the death penalty. The Court also cited the lack of
evidence in the form of legislation and jury studies indicating opposition to executing mentally retarded offenders. 209 Yet, Penry presented
fairly strong evidence, in the form of public-opinion polls, indicating
that a very substantial majority of people in several southern states
opposed the execution of the mentally retarded. 20 The Court plausibly could have concluded that mentally retarded offenders, although
criminally responsible, generally lack the culpability to warrant capital
punishment.
2. Potential Problems Facing Expansion of the
Proportionality Doctrine
The Court's expansion of proportionality restrictions would raise
some difficult problems. First, any firm lines that the Court would
articulate could appear "arbitrary" in that they would not follow any
clearly evident demarcations revealed by evidence of societal consensus. Societal opposition to the death penalty is likely to exist along
various continuums of gradually decreasing support for the penalty. 1
A particular line drawn across such a continuum can always be characterized as arbitrary in that similarly situated offenders will fall on
212
either side of it.
If, for example, the Court defined eighteen years
as the minimum offender age for death eligibility, a few days in age
difference between two offenders might make one offender eligible
for the death penalty but the other offender ineligible.213 Yet, this
See id. at 333 ("[T]he jury rejected his insanity defense, which reflected their

conclusion that Penry knew that his conduct was wrong and was capable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law.").
2 See id. at 333-35.
210

See id. at 335.

21 For a discussion of this problem in a different context, see Frederick Schauer,

Slippey Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 378-81 (1985).
2 This problem is represented in the classical Greek paradox of Sorites. A grain
of sand is removed from a heap, but even many successive removals of single grains do
not remove the heap. When, then, does the removal of a grain render the heap
something other than a heap? See id. at 377. Regarding philosophical efforts to
articulate an understanding of the paradox, see generally Crispin Wright, LanguageMastery and the Sorites Paradox, in TRUTH AND MEANING 223 (Gareth Evans & John
McDowell eds., 1976).
215 See, e.g.,Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils ofLine-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death
Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 245 (1989) (exemplifying this problem by using a case
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214

sort of arbitrariness
does not warrant abandonment of efforts to
define the prerequisites for death eligibility.21 5 It is worth recalling
that death eligibility is not a mandate for the imposition of a death
sentence. States remain free to provide for further consideration of
mitigating factors for offenders within the death-eligible category.
Expanding the categorical exclusions could also be criticized as
providing an overly protective prophylaxis not supported by evidence
of public consensus. Critics might contend that a categorical ban on
the death penalty should find support in objective evidence of nearly
uniform public opinion as manifested by the actions of legislatures
andjuries. Several of the Justices have taken this position in rejecting
proposed expansions of current proportionality protections.216 The
Eighth Amendment, however, does not require this conclusion, and
this position largely abandons any role for a constitutional check on

involving two brothers closely related in age who were charged with similar involvement in a capital crime).
214 It may, indeed, be incorrect to characterize this problem as one involving
"arbitrariness." On this point, Professor Schauer's comments are apt:
Although this usage of "arbitrary" is commonplace, I have some reservations
about employing that term in this context. The decisions about where to
draw the line along a continuous range, although in some sense impressionistic rather than precise, are still based on a process of reasoning. Arbitrariness is relative to domain. Requiring that a certain deliberative body not take
action without a two-thirds majority is perhaps arbitrary relative to the choice
among two-thirds, sixty-four percent, and sixty-eight percent, but it would still
be possible to explain rationally the reasoning process that produces some,,thing in this range rather than, say, fifty-one percent or ninety-eight percent.
To the extent that the word "arbitrary" carries a connotation of irrationality, it
does not seem to capture what is going on when we gauge where best to place
a demarcation along a continuum.
Schauer, supra note 211, at 380 n.51.
215See Rosen, supra note 94, at 1161 (arguing that when the Supreme Court
"confronts a problem serious and pervasive enough to require correction in a relatively large number of cases ....
[t]he best way to solve [the] problem is to create a
firm rule").
216 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-74 (1989)
(Scalia, J.,joined by
Rehnquist, CJ., and White, O'Connor, & Kennedy, fJ.)
(asserting that societal rejection of the death penalty must find support in objective examination of legislation and
sentencer determinations, and, on that basis, concluding that the death penalty is not
proscribed for those who were 16 or 17 when they committed a capital offense); Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 351 (1989) (Scalia, J.,joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and White &
Kennedy, ]J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the claim that
mental retardation of an offender categorically bars the death sentence and asserting
that a punishment is not "unusual" for Eighth Amendment purposes when "an objective examination of laws and jury determinations fails to demonstrate society's disapproval of it").

852

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW

[Vol. 146:795

legislative action. 217 Even the conclusion reached in Coker, outlawing
the death penalty for rape, lacked convincing evidence that legislators
and juries were resolutely opposed in all circumstances to punishing
rapists with death.
The Court pursued the general consensus-that
the capital punishment should be inflicted on only the deservingalthough objective evidence of how that principle applied to rape was
not entirely clear.219
To serve the value represented by the deserts limitation, the
Court could also plausibly articulate prophylactic rules that give a
margin of extra protection where the contours of societal consensus
are vague. This means, of course, that the prophylactic rule derived
from the Constitution may be violated without always, in a strict sense,
violating the Constitution. Yet, the use of prophylactic rules in constitutional adjudication is commonplace220 It is difficult to imagine
constitutional law developing in any other way.22' The holding in
Cokeritself is a prophylactic rule rather than one conforming precisely
to the Eighth Amendment value against retributive excess. Even in
death-penalty states not punishing rape with death, the only societal
consensus regarding capital punishment as applied to rape is that
217

On this point, Professor Radin's comments are instructive:

[C]onclusive reliance on these indicators either through substantive definition or extreme judicial deference is circular. Constitutional doctrine may
not be formulated by the acts of those institutions which the Constitution is
supposed to limit. To glean a list of permissible punishments from those enacted by legislatures either assumes that legislators never enact a punishment
they think is, or may be, cruel or allows the legislature to define permissible
punishments by its enactments. Such a view removes any role for a constitutional check.
Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standardsfor the Cruel and
UnusualPunishmentsClause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1036 (1978).
218 There was neither evidence that legislators thought the death penalty was
altogether inappropriate for rape, nor evidence that jurors would not impose the
death penalty in a significant percentage of rape cases. See supra notes 199-201 and
accompanying text.
219 See Fallon, supra note 160, at 1543 (asserting that the Court acts appropriately in
attempting to discern and follow society's deeper values in its job of articulating moral
values).
An example is the Court's famous holding that "the prosecution
may not use
statements ... stemming from custodial interrogation of [a] defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards... to secure the privilege against selfincrimination" in Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the prophylactic nature
of which is discussed, for example, in StephenJ. Schulhofer, RecomideingMiranda, 54
U. CH. L. REv. 435, 446-53 (1987).
22 For an explanation of why prophylactic rules are a central
and necessary aspect
of constitutional law, see David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI.
L. REV. 190 (1988).
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rape is not usually punished appropriately with death, not that rape is
never appropriately so punished. The same sort of conclusion could
be reached regarding youthful offenders, many felony murderers, the
insane, and the mentally retarded. Based on the need to articulate
prophylactic rules to protect against retributive excess in the use of
capital punishment, the Court could extend existing proportionality
protections to these categories of offenders.
No conflict exists between the conclusion that the Court properly
could extend proportionality protections through prophylactic rules
and the conclusion that the Court lacks the authority to regulate the
capital-sentencing trial. One might wonder whether the Court could
appropriately announce prophylactic protections from death eligibility that do not hew to a clear Eighth Amendment command if the
Court could not appropriately create precise decisional rules to be
followed by capital sentencers to protect against retributive excess.2
Important differences exist, however, between the two approaches.
In articulating proportionality rules, the Court only sets low eligibility
requirements above which state legislatures may govern the process
for selecting those who should die. In attempting to regulate capitalsentencing trials, the Court articulates procedures that cover all decisions to impose death.2 The former approach only confines legislative action within reasonable boundaries and, in doing so, rather
clearly serves a constitutional function. The latter approach more
substantially displaces the legislative prerogative while providing little
clear protection against unwarranted decisions to impose death. In
pursuit of an Eighth Amendment value, the Court more appropriately could impose a moderate intrusion on the democratic process
than a larger one, particularly if the moderate intrusion better serves
the constitutional principle.

III.B.

22 See supraPart
22s As noted earlier,

the only theoretically plausible rationale on which the Eighth

Amendment regulates the capital-sentencing decision is that the Eighth Amendment
protects against undeserved death sentences and that some convicted capital offenders do not deserve the death penalty. See supra Part III.A. However, in deciding
whether to control capital-sentencing trials under this view of the Eighth Amendment,
the Court still faces an outcome-determinative question. Does the Court know how to
specify in any detail who deserves the death penalty and who does noO If the Court is

unable to articulate with substantial precision the substantive measure(s) for determining who should die, the reason for regulating the trial under the Eighth Amend-

ment disappears. See supra Part III.B. Alternatively, the Court must articulate a
decisional standard to limit who is condemned, which means that the Court articulates
a test that guides every decision to impose death and forecloses legislative judgment
on this question.
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B. ReducingInconsistency in the Distributionof DeathSentences
Critics correctly would note that tightening the prophylactic
death-eligibility rules would not eliminate the potential for substantial
inconsistency in the distribution of death sentences. Limiting Eighth
Amendment restrictions to defining death eligibility, however, would
not open floodgates of inconsistency in the distribution of death
sentences. As a preliminary matter, it is worth reiterating that consistency or nonarbitrariness in the treatment of capital offenders is not
mandated by the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, tightening Eighth
Amendment rules on death-eligibility definitions certainly would not
produce more inconsistency than under the Court's current Eighth
Amendment doctrine.2 4 The Court's regulation of capital-sentencing
trials has done very little to ensure consistency between murderers
who receive the capital punishment and murderers who are spared. z
It is not possible for states to enact systems permitting much more
sentencer discretion than is requiredunder current Court doctrine.2'
Other provisions in the Constitution can also provide some help
in reducing inconsistency in the distribution of death sentences. The
Court's relatively recent decisions in Turner v. Murray7 and Batson v.
Kentucky2s help to protect against racial bias by jurors in capital cases.
Turner held that capital defendants accused of interracial crimes are

22 Tightening the death-eligibility standard for felony murders, see supra notes 9395, indeed could have a major impact on race-based disparities in capital sentencing
because of the cross-racial nature of many felony murders. See Rosen, supra note 94, at
1117-20 (discussing the racial make-up of felony-murder cases compared to that of
nonfelony-murder cases).
See supra Part II.A.
Tightening the death-eligibility rules may promote "nonarbitrariness." As
already noted, it is uncertain just what it means to say that a capital-sentencing system
produces "arbitrary" results. See supra note 214. It is not clear what an "arbitrary"
result is until it is clear what the proper standard is for deciding who should be sentenced to death, and the Court has not settled on such a standard. Further, it is not
clear how to define the group who is not sentenced to death. Does it include only
those who are found guilty of a capital offense, or should it include those who are
factually guilty of capital offenses but who are allowed to plead guilty to lesser crimes?
Some have argued that the Court's definition of "arbitrariness" is principally concerned with preventing what are akin to undeserved death sentences. See, e.g.,
McCord, supra note 11, at 573-75 (discussing minimizing overinclusion as the Court's
primary concern). If that view is correct, tightening the definition of death eligibility
would help promote "consistency" in that it would help ensure that only those who
deserve death receive that sanction.
2V 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
22 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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entitled, under the Sixth Amendment right to an impartaljury,2 to
inform venire members of the race of the victim and to question
them about their racial prejudices.2
Batson and its progeny have
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to restrict the ability of
prosecutors to eliminate minority venire persons with peremptory
strikes23' Although these decisions do not foreclose racial discrimination in the overall process of selecting which murderers will die, they
provide some protection at the capital-sentencing stage in states that
rely on juries to reach the capital-sentencing decision.
The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
This provision applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment See Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 (1975) (holding that a state's systematic exclusion from
jury duty of women as a class would deprive the defendant of his "Sixth Amendment
right to ajury drawn from a fair cross section of the community"). Ajury is not required at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. See supra note 178. However, the
Court also has concluded that due process requires that ajury, if provided, be impartial even in a context in which ajury is not constitutionally mandated. See Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (concluding that barring a capital defendant from
asking venire members if they would automatically vote for a death sentence after a
guilty verdict violates due process).
2' See Turner, 476 U.S. at 36-37 ("We hold that a capital defendant accused of an
interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the
victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.").
2 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 ("[T]he State's privilege to strike individual
jurors
through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection
Clause."). A decision by the Court building on Batson held that any criminal defendant could raise the equal-protection challenge, even if the defendant was not of the
same race as the excluded venire member. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 414
(1991) (noting the Court's recognition that "discrimination in the jury selection
process may lead to the reversal of a conviction"). The equal-protection claim also
now restricts the use of peremptories based on gender. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994) (holding that intentional gender discrimination by
state actors in the use of peremptory strikes injury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause).
252 Critics would justifiably contend that the protection provided
is minor. The
protection provided in Turner would help ferret out only venire persons who are
willing to confess their racial prejudices, although much racial prejudice is unconscious. See generally Lawrence, supra note 129. Even when the prejudice is held consciously, the venire member may be ashamed to admit its existence. The practical
effect of the Batson holding is reduced because the prosecutor need only give a
neutral nondiscriminatory reason for striking the venire member, even if the reason is
not very convincing. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groupsfrom Juiy Service, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 761 (analyzing the Supreme
Court's decision in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), upholding as raceneutral a prosecutor's explanation that he had struck Latino jurors who appeared
hesitant when stating that they would not consider their own understanding of witnesses' testimony spoken in Spanish).
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The Court could also improve the fairness of the capital-selection
process by demanding better legal representation for capital offenders. A significant disparity exists in the quality of counsel afforded
capital offenders.233 This disparity contributes to the appearance of
inequity in the distribution of death sentences.2
The current approach to addressing this problem is generally only to ask post hoc
whether counsel's performance has been adequate. s The governing
standard for proving inadequate counsel, articulated in Strickland v.
Washington, is also difficult for a defendant to meet. To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that
counsel's performance has been objectively deficient and that the
deficiency has prejudiced the defendant.s 7 Strickland has been decried by numerous commentators as providing inadequate protection
for defendants-particularly capital defendants. 238 The Court could
impose greater demands for quality representation by altering the
Strickland test in favor of capital defendants.s 9 The Court could also
hold that states must create systems for providing quality representa2M

See, e.g., Vivian Berger, The Chiropractoras Brain Surgeon: Defense Lauyering in

CapitalCases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 249 (1991) ("[T]he death-penalty
context operates-especially in the deep South-to magnify the problems already
endemic to indigent defense, thereby fostering 'no-fault' or 'low fault' ineffectiveness
on a broad scale."); Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor:. The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1841 (1994) (discussing the
pervasive inadequacy of counsel for the poor and the reasons for it); Douglas W. Vick,
PoorhouseJustice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitray Death Sentences, 43
BuFF. L. REv. 329, 380 (1995) ("Resource deprivation of defense services is manifested
in different ways in different states, but regardless of the system used, funding for the
defense of capital cases is woefully insufficient in most jurisdictions in the United
States."); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving
Standardof Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 324-25 ("One of the most striking aspects of
our system of capital punishment is the disparity in the quality of representation
afforded defendants.").
See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 421 ("Perhaps the most significant
source of inequality in the administration of the death penalty is the unevenness of
representation."); Marcia Coyle et al.,FatalDefense: Trial and Errorin the Nation'sDeath
Belt NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30 (alluding to the unfairness resulting from the
disparity in the quality of trial counsel representing capital defendants).
215 See Steiker & Steiker, supranote 3, at 421 (noting that "the Court has sought to
address the representation issue solely by providing for post-trial" evaluation of attorney performance).
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
23 See id. at 687 (setting out the test for ineffective assistance of counsel).
See Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness,and the Eighth
Amendment 75 TEx. L. REv. 1301, 1306 n.20 (1997) (listing authorities in which
Stricklandhas been criticized as inadequate protection for capital defendants).
29 For an argument of this sort, see, for example, White, supra note 233, at 376-78.
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ion to capital defendants. 240 The Court could easily conclude that
the right to counsel requires heightened protection for defendants in
the capital context. On several occasions, the Court has noted that
"death is different" from other forms of punishment so as to require
heightened reliability,24' and the Court could employ this rationale to
require more consistent, quality representation by counsel. 42 This
mandate of quality counsel would emanate from the Sixth Amendment,24 although the requirement would also serve the Eighth
Amendment goal2 4 of assuring that only deserving offenders receive
the death penalty.

4

2'0 For recent commentary favoring this approach, see, for example, Bilionis &
Rosen, supra note 238, at 1311-12, and Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 421-22.
241 See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986) (invalidating a death sentence

as violative of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury where a black defendant
charged with an interracial crime was not allowed to question potential jurors about
their racial prejudices); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (invalidating a
death sentence under the Due Process Clause because the state jury was not permitted
to consider a verdict of guilt on a lesser included offense); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.
349, 357-62 (1977) (invalidating a death sentence under the Due Process Clause based
on the failure to reveal to the defense counsel a pre-sentence report on which the
sentencingjudge purported to rely).
242Although mandatory sentencing is permissible in the noncapital context,
a
defendant has the right to counsel at sentencing. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
137 (1967) (noting this requirement in a case which can be characterized either as a
"revocation of probation" or a "deferred sentencing"). Thus, although I have argued
that the Eighth Amendment should never have been understood to foreclose death
sentences mandatory upon conviction, this would not eliminate the right to counsel at
sentencing hearings.
24 The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall.., have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
Court has held that this provision applies to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "fundamental and
essential to fair trials," and therefore is applicable to all felony defendants prosecuted
in state courts).
24 The mandate is properly grounded in the Sixth Amendment
because that is the
provision directly articulating the requirement of quality counsel. Unevenness of
counsel can be thought to contribute to the "arbitrary" or "inconsistent" distribution
of death sentences. Nonetheless, even if accepted as a valid interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment, which it is not, a "nonarbitrariness" or "consistency" goal would
not necessarily call for consistently high-quality representation of capital defendants.
If the Eighth Amendment were only concerned with "nonarbitrariness" or
"consistency" as those terms are conventionally understood, consistently poor defense
lawyering, just as with consistently good lawyering, would provide consistency of representation across cases. The true Eighth Amendment value applicable to the selection
process in capital cases, of course, is that only defendants who deserve the death
penalty should receive that sanction. Providing high-quality counsel for all capital
defendants serves this Eighth Amendment value. One could conclude that the Eighth
Amendment requires quality counsel to protect the deserts-limitation ideal. However,
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The Equal Protection Clause, of course, would also continue to
pose limits on inequality in the distribution of death sentences, and
the equal-protection context is the proper place for arguments about
most equality commands. 26 Critics of the death penalty as currently
applied might argue that equal protection should extend beyond
purposeful discrimination to require capital-sentencing systems that
do not produce significant disparities based on factors such as race.
247
246
In MCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court rejected this contention.
Although precedent did not strongly support the contention that
248
one could disagree with
McCleskey was denied equal protection,
the Court's view of equal protection as not extending beyond purposeful discrimination by decisionmakers in the capital-selection

process. 249
the Sixth Amendment provides a more direct mandate for high-quality counsel in
capital cases than the Eighth Amendment. Cf Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37
(1986) (invalidating death sentence, but not conviction, of a black defendant charged
with killing a white victim, because the trial court's refusal to allow questioning of
potential jurors regarding their racial prejudices violated not the Eighth Amendment
but the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury).
214 See Gross & Mauro, supra note 131, at 114-15 (giving examples of racial classifications in a capital-selection process which would be explicit and, therefore, clearly
violative of equal protection).
246 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
247 Regarding the equal-protection claim in McCleskey's petition, the majority said
that proof was required "that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory
purpose." Id. at 292. The Court's opinion would seemingly allow establishment of a
prima facie case of discriminatory purpose based on statistical analysis of a particular
prosecutor's resolution of numerous earlier capital cases. The Court rejected the
notion, however, that system-wide statistics regarding decisions by numerous prosecutors and sentencing juries could make out even a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination by a particular prosecutor or sentencingjury. See id. at 319 ("Despite
McCleskey's wide-ranging arguments... the only question before us is whether in his
case.., the law of Georgia was properly applied." (citation omitted)).
248 As Professor Randall Kennedy has aptly noted:
If McCleskey disappoints, it should do so on some basis other than tradition, for the majority cannot rightly be accused of promulgating a starting
ruling. To the contrary, McCleskey was all too predictable. Its critics must face
the fact that, as far as reported cases disclose, defendants rarely, verging on
never, succeed in challenging punishments using arguments of the sort
voiced by Warren McCleskey's attorneys.
KENNEDY, supra note 117, at 340.
249 For the argument of two commentators who take this position, see Gross &
Mauro, supra note 131, at 117.
A serious effort to achieve consistency in capital sentencing, however, raises a
variety of troubling problems that only add to the questions about its propriety as
constitutional doctrine. See id. at 123-26 (suggesting that de facto abolition of the
death penalty might be the only effective remedy); see also Scott W. Howe, The Constitution and CapitalSentencing: PursuingJustice and Equality, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 749, 772-
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The ultimate irony, however, of pursuing consistency as the goal
for regulating capital sentencing (as opposed to abolishing capital
punishment) is that in the long run, the endeavor cuts at least as
much in favor of increased use of the death penalty, and mostly on
minority defendants, as it does in favor of reduced use of the death
penalty. 0 As Professor Randall Kennedy has clarified, the Baldus
study, upon which the McCleskey case relied,' said at least as much
about the inequitable treatment of black murder victims as it said
about the inequitable treatment of black murderers. 252 The data
showed that the race of the victim was, by far, the primary racial
2 3
influence at work in the aggregate of capital cases from Georgia.
Killers of white victims were much more likely to get the death penalty than killers of black victims.2 Although among murderers who
killed white victims, black defendants were disproportionately condemned, the race-of-victim factor heavily favored black murder defendants as a group because black murderers typically killed black

78 (1992) (discussing problems of defining consistency and providing an appropriate
remedy); Kennedy, supra note 107, at 1429-40 (discussing the problem of devising an

acceptable remedy).
mAs for legislative attempts to require consistency in capital sentencing, the
Racial Justice Act, S. 1249, 102d Cong. (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S7381-82
(daily ed. June 6, 1991), would have allowed a capital defendant to use state-wide

statistical evidence to establish a prima facie showing that her death sentence resulted
from racial discrimination and, unless that showing were rebutted, to have her death
sentence vacated. See id. § 3(a), reprintedin 137 CONG. REC. S7381-82 (daily ed. June 6,
1991). The act was defeated by proponents of the death penalty. See 137 CONG. REC.

S8300 (daily ed. June 20, 1991). A similar bill was subsequently introduced but then
removed from the 1991 omnibus crime bill. See Clifford Krauss, House Approves AntiCrimeBill with Somethingfor Both Camps, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1991, at Al. Another bill
was introduced but then removed from a 1994 omnibus crime bill. See Bryan Denison,
Since Days of "Old Sparky, "Racial Issue Survives: QuestionsAbout Fairness UnresolvedEven
Today, HOUS. POST, Oct. 16, 1994, at A2, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Houpst File.
2' As for the nature of the Baldus study, see supra notes 107-12 and accompanying

text.

22 Professor Kennedy noted: "The defendant-centered paradigm
[in the McCleskey
case] never allowed the victimization of the black community to reach the surface of
the debate. Yet the state's response to the murder of members of that community is
precisely what the race-of-the-victim statistics chart." Kennedy, supranote 107, at 1422
(footnote omitted).
2, See supranotes 107-12 and accompanying text.
25 As previously indicated, out of 981 white-victim murder cases brought between
1973 and 1979, 108 of them, or 11%, resulted in death sentences. In contrast, out of
1503 black-victim murder cases brought during the same period, only 20 of them, or a
little over 1%, resulted in death sentences. Seesupra note 108.
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victims, and the black-victim category accounted for most murders.2 5
Of course, the disproportionately low distribution of capital sentences
against killers of black victims could be solved through increased use
of the death penalty in black-victim cases.z Yet, this solution would
likely increase the percentage of death sentences imposed on black
defendants and would surely increase the overall use of the death
penalty.257 An important message worth contemplating, then, is that
under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment,
seriously pursuing consistency as the goal for regulating capital sentencing is, at least in the long run, potentially pro-death penalty.m
CONCLUSION

The effort of the Supreme Court to guide capital sentencing un-

der the Eighth Amendment was destined to fail. The Court has not
given the Eighth Amendment a fair chance. It has never arrived at a

25 Out of 2484 murder cases brought between 1973 and 1979, 1503 of them
(60%) were cases involving black victims. Of the 1503 black-victim cases, 1443 of them
(96%) involved black defendants. See supranote 108.
See Kennedy, supra note 107, at 1436 (noting that a "level-up" solution could
build "on the assumption that put to a choice, jurisdictions committed to capital
punishment would opt to increase the level of capital sentencing for black-victim
murders rather than abolish capital punishment or lower the level of capital sentencing for white-victim murders").
27 This conclusion would remain true even if in the white-victim
cases, the deathsentencing rate for black defendants were reduced to the same rate as that for white
defendants and the death-sentencing rate for black-victim cases then only tracked the
death-sentencing rate for white-victim cases. Within the white-victim cases, the researchers estimated that, after controlling for other seemingly relevant variables, a
black defendant was 2.4 times more likely to receive a death penalty than a white
defendant. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 64, at 328. However, the much greater
aggregate influence was the race of the victim. The researchers estimated that a
defendant who killed a white person was for that reason alone 4.3 times more likely to
receive a death sentence than a defendant who killed a black person. See id. at 324.
Because, as the table in footnote 108 reveals, the vast majority of murder cases involved black victims, a death-sentencing rate equal to that resulting in the whitedefendant-white-victim cases would result in an increase in the number of death
sentences imposed. See supranote 108.
2 Using race-conscious techniques to produce results that would provide "equal
protection" to the community of actual and potential black victims would raise troubling questions. Yet, not every sort of "level-up" solution would violate the Constitution. Indeed, some prominent scholars have argued that a "level-up" approach to
preventing race-of-the-victim discrimination would be preferable to the state of affairs
produced by McCleskey. See, e.g., Kennedy, supranote 107, at 1439 ("[D]espite risks that
would have to be carefully monitored, a level-up remedy for race-of-the-victim disparities would be far preferable to the situation bequeathed to us by the McCleskey
Court.").
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plausible theory about how the Eighth Amendment regulates capital
sentencing. The Court has typically asserted that the aim is to achieve
"nonarbitrariness" or "consistency" in the use of the death penalty.
Yet, this stated goal does not describe what the Court has actually
accomplished, for capital sentencers can be-and are-given virtually
as much discretion under the Court's Eighth Amendment doctrine as
they were given in the pre-Furman era. The failure of the Court to
pursue consistency, except in its rhetoric, derives not only from the
difficulty of the task, but also from the incongruity of that goal with
Eighth Amendment values. Consistent treatment of capital offenders
can be achieved by executing all of them. Unless a substantive Eighth
Amendment standard exists by which to distinguish among capital
offenders-a view that the Court has not endorsed-one cannot
complain on consistency grounds about the offenders' uniformly
harsh treatment. The irony of concluding that uniformly harsh
treatment of all capital offenders could result from a protection
against "cruel and unusual punishments" underscores that consistency is not the operative Eighth Amendment value.
The true Eighth Amendment protection that bears on capital sentencing is the prohibition on retributive excess. In the death-penalty
context, this prohibition means that offenders should not suffer
death sentences that they do not deserve, which is essentially to say
that offenders are not appropriately sentenced to death because of
utilitarian interests. Further, this deserts-limitation principle does not
call for consistent treatment of capital offenders; it operates only as a
limitation on decisions to impose death, not as a limitation on decisions to refrain from imposing death. Significant aspects of the
Court's decisions do not coincide with the deserts limitation, but this

principle explains much more of the Court's current doctrine than
the consistency theory.
Although the deserts limitation appropriately guides capital sentencers, it cannot justify intrusion by the Court into the administration of capital-sentencing trials. The difficulty grows from the
inability of the Court to define with substantial precision how to
measure offender deserts. The Court has been unable to describe
how capital sentencers should weigh various, and often competing,
evidentiary factors to pursue the deserts inquiry. Indeed, the Court
has not even been able to describe what evidence is truly relevant, in
the sense that the capital sentencer must actually weigh it in reaching
a decision. The Eighth Amendment value is grounded in an effort to
pursue societal consensus, but the societal consensus in favor of the
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deserts limitation does not translate into refined rules at these more
exacting levels. Yet, the Court should be able to discern fairly precise
rules before it seeks to enforce the deserts limitation at the capitalsentencing trial. The Eighth Amendment rationale for preventing
legislatures from specifying the rules disintegrates if the Court cannot
say what the rules should be.
The Court can legitimately enforce Eighth Amendment restrictions on who is subject to the death penalty. The proper domain of
the Court lies in drawing categorical lines defining relatively precisely
which offenders are death-eligible. The Court has appropriately
employed the deserts-limitation ideal to articulate and enforce these
kinds of per se rules under the Eighth Amendment. Rather than
providing a capital-sentencing trial to attempt to enforce the deserts
limitation, the Court should have focused on expanding these deatheligibility protections.
The Court's experiment with capital-sentencing regulation counts
among its major modern failures. The Court has accomplished very
little of value, after investing vast judicial resources.2 9 When Furman
was decided, some observers believed that the Court could promote
substantial consistency in the use of capital punishment to secure
equity for powerless defendants. In retrospect, that confidence reflected a misperception both about the disparities at work in the
distribution of death penalties and about the difficulty of reducing
them. The Court should acknowledge the incongruity between the
proclaimed goal of substantial consistency and what the Court's doctrine actually achieves. The Court could try to address the conflict by
more vigorously pursuing consistency, but that goal lacks a grounding
in the Eighth Amendment. The Court would do better by concluding
that its goal is not to achieve consistency, but rather to protect against
undeserved death sentences, which is the true Eighth Amendment
value that bears on capital sentencing. In the end, however, the

29 No serious student of the Court's capital-sentencing doctrine could accept as
sincere the Court's continuing claims of pursuing "nonarbitrariness" or "consistency"
in the distribution of death sentences. As two thoughtful scholars of the death penalty
have recently noted:
The Supreme Court's death penalty law, by creating an impression of enormous regulatory effort while achieving negligible regulatory effects, effectively
obscures the true nature of our capital sentencing system, in which the preFurman world of unreviewable sentencer discretion lives on, with much the
same consequences in terms of arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing patterns.
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 436.
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Court's inability to refine significantly the deserts limitation destines
it to failure in the effort to use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the
capital-sentencing proceeding.
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